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A JURISPRUDENTIAL SURVEY OF THE TORT OF 
SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE: RESOLVING THIRD-PARTY 
INSURANCE COMPANY AUTOMOBILE SPOLIATION CLAIMS
STEVEN PLITT1 AND JORDAN R. PLITT2
I. INTRODUCTION: THE ISSUE OF THE SPOLIATION TORT
Thousands of automobile accidents occur on public roadways each 
year, leaving behind totally and partially damaged cars, trucks, motorcycles 
and other motor vehicles.  Personal injuries and property damage arising 
from each accident have the potential to produce a lawsuit.  The potential 
lawsuits encompass a myriad of parties, claims, and cross-claims which may 
or may not be known and/or foreseeable. Against this vast expanse of 
potential litigation, the following question arises: what is the duty of an 
insurance company that may possess or control one of the totally or partially 
damaged vehicles or vehicle components to preserve that evidence for future 
potential litigation involving lawsuits brought by insureds against alleged 
tortfeasors?  
Part II of this Article provides a general background of the 
spoliation of evidence tort along with the current trend of adopting the tort 
amongst the states.  Part III provides insight into the numerous approaches 
courts have employed in fixing the spoliation problem.  The problematic 
issues that arise with imposing an independent tort on third parties, 
specifically insurance companies, are analyzed in Part IV.  Part V offers 
recommendations for the future to resolve the spoliation tort dilemma 
efficiently and effectively. 
———————————————————————————–
1 Steven Plitt is an Assistant Adjunct Professor of Law at the 
University of Arizona College of Law.  Professor Plitt is the current revising 
author for COUCH ON INSURANCE (3RD ed. 1995). He has written numerous 
books, law reviews, and other professional publications in the field of 
insurance law. Mr. Plitt is a nationally recognized commentator on insurance 
law issues and has been retained in 33 states as an expert witness and 
consultant regarding insurance law issues and claims. 
2 Jordan Plitt is a Member at The Cavanagh Law Firm located in 
Phoenix, AZ.  His practice includes complex insurance coverage, bad faith 
litigation and professional liability defense.  He is an associate author for 
COUCH ON INSURANCE (3RD ed. 1995) and PRACTICAL TOOLS FOR 
HANDLING INSURANCE CASES (2011).
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II. OVERVIEW-THE SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE TORT IN 
GENERAL
A. THE NATURE OF THE SPOLIATION TORT
The spoliation tort emerged in reaction to widespread discovery 
abuse where litigants render discoverable evidence permanently unavailable 
to both the court and the adverse party.3 “Spoliation” has been defined as 
the “failure to preserve property for another’s use in pending future 
litigation.”4 Derived from the Latin phrase “contra spoliatorem omnia 
praesumuntur,” or “all things presumed against the destroyer,”5 spoliation 
encompasses the loss, destruction, or material alteration of evidence.6 This 
goes beyond concealment or suppression of evidence because the evidence 
———————————————————————————–
3 See Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, 
Its Principle Problems and Abuses, AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 787, 829 (1980) 
(noting that it is “difficult to exaggerate the pervasiveness of evasive 
tactics" including spoliation); Edward J. Imwinkelried, A New Antidote for an 
Opponent’s Pre-Trial Discovery Misconduct: Treating the Misconduct at Trial as 
an Admission by Conduct of the Weakness of the Opponents Case, BYU L. REV. 
793, 794 (1993) (“[D]eliberate destructionism is common place.”); Charles 
R. Nesson, Incentives to Spoliate Evidence in Civil Litigation: The Need for 
Vigorous Judicial Action, 13 CARDOZA L. REV. 793, 795 (1991) (overwhelming 
incentive exists for spoliation because it is unlikely that an opponent would 
discover either the spoliated evidence or the act of spoliation itself).
4 Solano v. Delancy, 264 Cal. Rptr. 721, 724 (Cal. App. 1989); see 
also West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2nd Cir. 
1999) (defining spoliation as “the destruction or significant alteration of 
evidence or the failure to preserve property for another’s use as evidence in 
pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation”); Powers v. S. Family Markets 
of Eastman, LLC., 740 S.E.2d 214 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013) (“Spoliation refers 
to the destruction or failure to preserve evidence that is necessary to 
contemplated or pending litigation.”); Kroger Co. v. Walters, 735 S.E.2d 99 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (reiterating that “[s]poliation refers to the destruction or 
failure to preserve evidence that is necessary to contemplated or pending 
litigation).
5 Goff v. Harold Ives Trucking Co. Inc., 27 S.W.3d 387, 389 (Ark. 2000); 
Armory v. Delamirie (1722) 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (KB).
6 Foster v. Lawrence Mem’l Hosp., 809 F. Supp. 831, 836 (D. Kan. 
1992) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1401 (6th ed. 1990)) (“’Spoliation’ has 
been defined as the intentional destruction or alteration of evidence.”).
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is lost.7 The spoliation tort is an interference tort involving protected 
expectancies8 with prospective civil action through the destruction of 
evidence.  This tort “is based on the premise that the destroyed evidence is 
adverse to the spoliation9 and that a party who has negligently or 
intentionally lost or destroyed evidence known to be relevant to an upcoming 
———————————————————————————–
7 Nix v. Hoke, 139 F. 2d 125, 135 (D.D.C. 2001) (observing that 
concealment and alteration are within the definition of “willful destruction 
of evidence”).
8 The California Court of Appeals became the first to explicitly recognize 
spoliation of evidence as an independent tort in, Smith v. Super., Ct. 198 
Cal. Rptr. 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), overruled by Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. 
Super. Ct., 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998). In this case, the plaintiff suffered 
injuries after an oncoming truck’s wheel disengaged causing a collision. 
Shortly after, the truck was towed to a dealer who had previously customized 
it with deep-dish mag wheels. The dealer agreed with plaintiffs’ attorney to 
preserve the evidence including the wheel and related parts for an expert to 
examine and inspect them for the plaintiff. The dealer disposed of the 
evidence knowing how critical the parts were to the plaintiffs’ case. Noting 
that “[t]he common thread woven into all torts is the idea of unreasonable 
interference with the interests of others,” the Court analogized spoliation to 
the tort of intentional interference with prospective business advantage. As 
such, the California Court of Appeals created the intentional tort of 
spoliation, holding that a potential products liability case is a valuable 
probable expectancy justifying legal protection from interference. Id. at 836-
837; See also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW 
OF TORTS 140-41 (5th ed. 1984) (explaining courts' recognition 
of spoliation as another noncommercial expectancy that deserves 
protection).
9 See also Sullivan v. General Motors Corp., 772 F. Supp. 358, 360 (N.D. 
Ohio 1991) (discussing that "[a]t common law, it was proper to presume that 
evidence which had been destroyed, or ‘spoliated,’ could be construed 
against the party responsible of the destruction of that evidence.”); Warner 
Barnes & Co. v. Kokosai Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha, 102 F.2d 450, 453 (2d Cir. 
1939), modified, 103 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1939) (“When a party is once found to 
be fabricating, or suppressing, documents, the natural . . . conclusion is that he 
has something to conceal, and is conscious of guilt.”).
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legal proceeding should be held accountable for any unfair prejudice that 
results.”10
The willful11 and bad faith destruction of evidence threatens the 
integrity of a trial, undermining a party’s opportunity for justice.12 In the 
absence of such relevant evidence, a party’s ability to prove a valid claim or 
defense is dramatically diminished.13 Spoliation of evidence, whether 
intentional and/or negligent, has consequential effects on the public’s 
———————————————————————————–
10 Keene v. Brigham and Women’s Hosp. Inc., 786 N.E.2d 824
(Mass. 2003).
11 See also Greenleaf Nursery v. E. I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 341 
F.3d 1292, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003) (explaining that spoliation is not the 
equivalent to the concealment or suppression of evidence); Steffen 
Nolte, The Spoliation Tort: An Approach to Underlying Principles, 26 ST.
MARY’S L.J., 351, 408 (1994) (noting that the distinction lies within the fact 
that evidence may still be produced at trial with concealment or 
suppression).
12 See Boldt v. Sanders, 111 N.W.2d 225, 228 (Minn. 1961) (“It is 
essential to the achievement of justice that all of the admissible evidence 
be brought . . . for trial or settlement with full knowledge of the facts.”). See 
also Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 597 A.2d 543, 550 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1991) (noting that the “destruction of evidence manifests a shocking 
disregard for orderly judicial procedures and offends traditional notions 
of fair play.”); Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Precision Components, 
Inc., 456 N.W.2d 434, 439 (Minn. 1990) (finding that destruction of 
evidence disregards judicial procedures and offends notions 
of fair play); Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp., 501 N.E.2d 1312, 1319 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1986) (“This state's system of civil litigation is founded in large part 
on a litigant's ability, under the authority of the Supreme Court rules, to 
investigate and uncover evidence after filing suit. Destruction of evidence 
known to be relevant to pending litigation violates the spirit of liberal 
discovery.”); Wichita Royalty Co. v. City Nat'l Bank of Wichita Falls 
et al., 109 F.2d 299, 302 (5th Cir. 1940) (defining spoliation as being 
“synonymous with pillaging, plundering and robbing”).
13 Telectron, Inc. v. Overhead Door Corp., 116 F.R.D. 107, 128 (S.D. 
Fla. 1987) (noting that a defendant “having purposefully, willfully, and in 
bad faith destroyed” relevant documents injured the plaintiff's “right to a full 
and fair adjudication of its claims on the merits.”); Cedars-Sinai, 954 
P.2d 511 (Cal.1998) (stating “[t]he intentional destruction of evidence is a 
grave affront to the cause of justice and deserves our unqualified 
condemnation.”)
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confidence in the judicial system.14 Courts have recognized that the 
“preservation of ... [potential] evidence ... presumably increase[s] the 
likelihood of a true and just verdict;”15 therefore, preservation of evidence 
warrants legal protection as an injury to a property interest.16
———————————————————————————–
14See Kammerer v. Sewerage Water Board of New Orleans, 93-
1232 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/15/94); 633 So. 2d 1357, 1362; Lawrence Solum & 
Stephen Marzen, Truth and Uncertainty: Legal Control of the Destruction 
of Evidence, 36 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1138 (1987) (“Destruction of evidence 
undermines two important goals of the judicial system – truth and fairness”).
15 Edwards v. Louisville Ladder Co., 89-1697-LC (W.D. La. 6/19/92); 796 
F. Supp. 966, 969 (“It is obvious that the preservation of items which might be 
relevant evidence in either prospective or ongoing litigation is desirable.”). See 
also Kammerer v. Sewerage Water Board of New Orleans, 93-1232 (La. App. 4 
Cir. 3/15/94); 633 So. 2d 1357, 1362 (Justice Waltzer concurring) (“The 
process itself is fair and the result presumably just where the parties have open 
opportunity to plead, discover, present and impeach evidence and argue 
alternative theories of the case. Where material evidence has been lost, the 
veracity and justice of the ultimate decision will of necessarily suffer.”).
16 See Ortega v. Trevino, 938 S.W.2d 219, 223 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) 
(“[A] claim for money damages in a civil lawsuit is an interest
in property belonging to the plaintiff.  By destroying the plaintiff's ability to 
prove his claim, the spoliator has destroyed a property interest which [the] 
law would otherwise protect and recognize as a valuable asset belonging to 
the plaintiff.”). See also Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Super. Ct. of 
San Bernardino County, 286 Cal. Rptr. 855, 864 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) 
(noting that spoliation of evidence in civil litigation constitutes an injury to 
a property interest); Augusta v. United Service Automobile Ass'n., 16 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 400, 404 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (discussing that a cause of action 
for spoliation of evidence involves an injury to property interest); Jablonski 
v. Royal Globe Insurance Co., 251 Cal. Rptr. 160, l68-69 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1988) (noting that the injury that results from one’s inability to present
relevant evidence due to its destruction); Hirsch v. General Motors Corp.,
628 A.2d 1108, 1119 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993) (“The spoliation tort 
protects a litigant's interest in bringing a prospective cause of action.”); 
Smith v. Superior Ct., 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 836-37 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) 
(“[W]e conclude that a prospective civil action . . . is a valuable ‘probable 
expectancy’ that the court must protect from . . . interference . . . ”); St. Mary's 
Hosp., Inc. v. Brinson, 685 So. 2d 33, 35 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 
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The issues surrounding the spoliation of evidence and how to 
remedy the loss of relevant evidence has been vetted thoroughly throughout 
the commentary.17 Commentators and courts have furnished various 
———————————————————————————–
1996) ("[A] prospective civil action... is a valuable probable expectancy that the 
court must protect from interference.").
17 See, e.g., Imwinkelried, supra note 3 at 793; Terry R. Spencer, Do Not 
Fold, Spindle or Mutilate: The Trend Towards the Recognition of Spoliation 
as a Separate Tort, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 37 (1993); Nesson, supra note 3 at 
793; Jeffrey S. Kinsler & Anne R. Keys MacIver, Demystifying Spoliation 
of Evidence, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 761 (1999); David A. Dell, Margaret M.
Koesel & Tracy L. Turnbull, Let’s Level The Playing Field: A New 
Proposal for Spoliation of Evidence Claims in Pending Litigation, 29 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 769 (1997); Mary K. Brown & Paul D. Weiner, Digital Dangers: A
Primer on Electronic Evidence in the Wake of Enron, 30 LITIG. 24, 69 
(2003); Johnathan Judge, Comment, Reconsidering Spoliation: Common-
Sense Alternatives to the Spoliation Tort, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 441 (2001); 
Phoebe L. McGlynn, Spoliation in the Products Liability Context, 27 U.
MEM. L. REV. 663 (1997); Shannon D. Hutchings, Tortious Liability for 
Spoliation of Evidence, 24 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 381 (2000);
Nolte, supra note 11 at 351; Margaret O. Frossard & Neal S. Gainsberg,
Spoliation of Evidence in Illinois: The Law After Boyd v. Traveler’s 
Insurance Co., 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 685 (1997); Mark D. Robbins,
Computers and the Discovery of Evidence – A New Dimension to Civil 
Procedure, 17 J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 411 (1999); Patrick 
Grady, Discovery of Computer Stored Documents and Computer Based 
Litigation Support Systems: Why Give Up More Than Necessary?, 14 J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 523 (1996); Bart S. Wilhoit, Spoliation of 
Evidence: The Viability of Four Emerging Torts, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 631
(1998); Maria A. Losavio, Synthesis of Louisiana Law on Spoliation of 
Evidence – Compared to the Rest of the Country, Did we Handle it 
Correctly?, 58 LA. L. REV. 837 (1998); Robert D. Peltz, The Necessity of 
Redefining Spoliation of Evidence, Remedies in Florida, 29 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 1289 (2002); Cecelia Hallinan, Balancing The Scales after Evidence is 
Spoiled: Does Pennsylvania’s Approach Efficiently Protect the 
Injured Party?, 44 VILL. L. REV. 947 (1999); Dale A. Nance, Missing 
Evidence, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 831 (1991); Jay E. Rivlin, Recognizing an 
Independent Tort Action will spoil a Spoliator’s Splendor, 26 HOFSTRA L.
REV., 1003, 1017 (1998); James T. Killelea, Spoliation of Evidence 
Proposals for New York State, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1045 (2005); 
John K. Stipancich, The Negligent Spoliation of Evidence: An Independent 
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explanations as to why recognition of an independent spoliation tort acts as 
an essential beneficial component within the judicial system: (1) the probable 
expectation of a favorable judgment or defense in future civil litigation are 
safeguarded by the tort;18 (2) traditional evidentiary remedies are not 
deterred by the spoliator of evidence;19 and (3) testimonial candor is 
preserved by the tort.20 However, the majority of jurisdictions that have 
———————————————————————————–
Tort Action may be the Only Acceptable Alternative, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1135 
(1992); Lawrence Solum & Stephen J. Marzen, Truth and Uncertainty:
Legal Control of the Destruction of Evidence, 36 EMORY L.J. 1085 (1987); 
David H. Canter, The Missing or Altered Product: Nightmare 
or Dream?, 26 SW. U.L. REV. 1051 (1997); John McArthur
McGuire & Robert C. Vincent, Admissions Implied from Spoliation or 
Related Conduct, 45 YALE L.J. 226 (1935); Sean R. Levine, Spoliation of 
Evidence in West Virginia: Do Too Many Torts Spoliate the Broth?, 104 W.
VA. L. REV. 419 (2002); Paul Gary Kekorian, Negligent Spoliation of 
Evidence: Skirting the ‘Suit within a Suit’ Requirement of Legal 
Malpractice, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1077 (1990); Charles B. 
Renfrew, Discovery Sanctions: A Judicial Prospective, 67 CAL. L. REV. 264 
(1979); R. Laird Hart, Note, Legal Ethics and the Destruction of 
Evidence, 88 YALE L.J. 1665 (1979); Andrea H. Rowse, Comment, 
Spoliation: Civil Liability for Destruction of Evidence, 20 U. RICH. L.
REV. 191 (1985); Dale A. Oesterle, A Private Litigant’s Remedies for an 
Opponent’s Inappropriate Destructions of Relevant Documents, 61 TEX. L.
REV. 1185 (1983); Anthony C. Casamassina, Comment, Spoliation of 
Evidence in Medical Malpractice, 14 PACE L. REV. 235 (1995); Robert W. 
Thompson, To The Prevailing Party Goes the Spoils: An Overview of an 
Emerging Tort in California, 18 W. ST. U. L. REV. 223 (1990); Monica L. 
Klug, Torts—Arizona Should Adopt the Tort of Intentional Spoliation of 
Evidence—La. Raia v. Superior Court, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 371 (1987).
18 Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456, 464 (Alaska 
1986).
19 Steve E. Couch, Spoliation of Evidence: Is One Man's Trashing
Another Man's Treasure, 62 TEX. B.J. 242, 243, n. 4 (1999); See also Wilhoit, 
supra note 17, at 669 (1998).
20 Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp., 501 N.E.2d 1312, 1319 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1986) (“This state's system of civil litigation is founded in large part on 
a litigant's ability, under the authority of the Supreme Court Rules, to 
investigate and uncover evidence after filing suit… Any duty to preserve 
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examined the issue have rejected the recognition of a spoliation tort. Those 
states that have recognized and created the tort of spoliation in some form, 
limit such an action to spoliation of evidence related to actual litigation.  
Courts are in disagreement on what constitutes spoliation and vary 
on how to apply the tort when the spoliator is a third-party, who is not a party 
to the underlying civil action.  This divergence has produced a variety of 
approaches to the spoliation of evidence dilemma.
B. THE CURRENT JUDICIAL LANDSCAPE OF THE SPOLIATION OF 
EVIDENCE TORT
Initially, the tort was not embraced by the courts.21 However, the 
spoliation issue has recently attracted greater attention.22 A current split 
exists between those jurisdictions that recognize a secondary cause of action 
for spoliation of evidence and those that reject the tort altogether.  Because 
of this split, the outcomes of such actions can be diverse depending on the 
state and the law it applies.  Four possible varieties of the tort of spoliation 
of evidence exist:  (1) intentional spoliation of evidence by an adverse party;23
———————————————————————————–
such items would undoubtedly be tempered by what a reasonable person 
would expect to be sought as evidence.”).
21 Edwards v. Louisville Ladder Co., 89-1697(W.D. La. 6/19/1992), 796 
F. Supp. 966, 968 (citing Pirocchi v. Liberty Mutual Ins., 365 F.Supp. 277 
(E.D. Pa. 1973) (“Despite the fact that the origins of a tort for spoliation of 
evidence trace back to at least 1973 no general consensus has developed as 
to the basis, essential elements, or even existence of such a tort.”); Coleman 
v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 185 (N.M. 1995) overruled on other grounds 
by Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., 34 P.3d 1148 (N.M. 2001) (“In 
general ... the tort of spoliation of evidence has not been widely adopted in 
other jurisdictions, nor has much agreement emerged on its contours and 
limitations.”).
22 See Henderson v. Tyrrell, 910 P.2d 522, 531 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) 
(“[d]estruction or loss of potentially relevant evidence is a long-standing 
problem, but it has attracted increased attention in the past . . .”).
23 While the elements of a prima facie case for intentional spoliation of 
evidence by a defendant vary from state to state due to each states’ public 
policy considerations, as a general rule the tort requires: (1) pending or 
probable litigation involving the plaintiff; (2) knowledge by the defendant of 
the existence or likelihood of the litigation; (3) intentional acts of spoliation 
by the defendant designed to disrupt the plaintiff's case; (4) disruption of the 
plaintiff's case; and (5) damages proximately caused by the defendant's 
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(2) intentional spoliation by a disinterested third party;24 (3) negligent 
spoliation of evidence by an adverse party;25 and (4) negligent spoliation of 
evidence by a disinterested third party.26 Spoliation of evidence committed 
by an adverse party to a lawsuit, is referred to as “first-party spoliation.”27
When committed by a non-party, it is called “third-party spoliation.28
Regardless of whether classified as intentional or negligent, the elements of 
these iterations of the tort are very similar29 with the main difference seen in 
the level of culpability.  
———————————————————————————–
acts. See, e.g., Nye v. CSX Transp., 437 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 2006) (applying 
Ohio law); Traylor v. Awwa, 899 F. Supp. 2d 216 (D. Conn. 2012) (applying 
Connecticut law).
24 See, e.g., Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560, 572 (W. Va. 2003) (adopting 
both first-party and third-party intentional spoliation of evidence and discussing 
the elements of the tort).
25 While the elements of negligent spoliation of evidence also vary, the 
general consensus delineated for a cause of action for negligent destruction 
of evidence are as follows: (1) existence of a potential civil action; (2) a legal 
or contractual duty to preserve evidence which is relevant to the potential 
civil action; (3) destruction of that evidence; (4) significant impairment in 
the ability to prove the lawsuit; (5) a causal relationship between the 
evidence destruction and the inability to prove the lawsuit; and (6) 
damages. See, e.g., Continental Ins. Co. v. Herman, 576 So. 2d 313, 315 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 710 A.2d 846,
851-54 (D.C. 1998).
26 See, e.g., Velasco v. Commercial Bldg. Maint. Co., 215 Cal. Rptr.
504, 506 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (establishing tort of negligent spoliation); See
also Smith v. Atkinson, 771 So. 2d 429 (Ala. 2000).
27 See Johnson v. United Serv.’s Auto Assn., 67 Cal. App. 4th 626, 628
(Cal. Ct. App.1998) (explaining that a first party spoliator is a party to the 
litigation in which the spoliation evidence is deemed relevant).
28 See Cole Vision Corp. v. Hobbs, 714 S.E.2d 537 (S.C. 2011); Superior 
Boiler Works, Inc. v. Kimball, 259 P.3d 676 (Kan. 2011); Lips v. Scottsdale 
Healthcare Corp., 229 P.3d 1008 (Ariz. 2010).
29 Compare Reilly PPA v. D'Errico, 1994 WL 547671, at *2, *6 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Sept. 21, 1994), and Foster v. Lawrence Mem. Hosp., 809 F. 
Supp. 831, 836 (Kan. 1992), with Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 
185 (N.M. 1995).
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1. Intentional Spoliation
The intentional form of the tort requires that the evidence be 
willfully destroyed by the spoliator.30 A small minority of states (seven) 
have recognized an independent tort for intentional spoliation.31 Of those 
states that have recognized a tort for intentional spoliation, most of them 
permit the tort in both a first-party and third-party context.32 A couple of 
———————————————————————————–
30 See, e.g., Coleman, 905 P.2d at 189.
31 The following states recognize an intentional spoliation of evidence 
causes of action for first-party and third-party actors: Alaska - Hazen v. 
Mun. of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1986), Nichols v. St. Farm Fire 
& Casualty Co., 6 P.3d 300, 304 (Alaska 2000), Hibbits v. Sides, 34 P.3d 
327, 328 (Alaska 2001); Connecticut - Rizzuto v. Davidson Ladders, 905 
A.2d 1165 (Ct. 2006) (the Court recognized first party intentional spoliation, 
but declined to address whether third party spoliation was legally 
cognizable); Kansas - Foster v. Lawrence Memorial Hosp., 
809 F.Supp. 831, 838 (Kan. 1992) (intentional spoliation recognized where 
defendant commits spoliation for its own advantage); Louisiana - Guillory 
v. Dillards Dep’t Store, Inc., 2000-190 (La. Ct. App. 10/11/2000), 777 
So.2d 1; New Mexico - Coleman, 905 P.2d 185 (N.M. 1995) overruled by 
Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., 34 P.3d 1148 (2001); Ohio - Smith v. 
Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037 (Ohio 1993); West 
Virginia - Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560 (W.V. 2003).
32 Alaska - Hazen v. Mun. of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456 (Alaska 
1986), Nichols v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 6 P.3d 300, 304 (Alaska 
2000), Hibbits v. Sides, 34 P.3d 327, 328 (Alaska 2001); Connecticut-
Rizzuto v. Davidson Ladders, 905 A.2d 1165 (Conn. 2006) (the court 
recognized first party intentional spoliation, but declined to address whether 
third party spoliation was legally cognizable); Kansas - Foster v. Lawrence 
Mem’l Hosp., 809 F.Supp. 831, 838 (Kan. 1992) (intentional spoliation 
recognized where defendant commits spoliation for its own advantage);
Louisiana - Guillory v. Dillard's Dep’t Store, Inc., 777 So. 2d 1 (La. Ct. 
App. 2000); New Mexico - Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 185 
(N.M. 1995), overruled by Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., 34 P.3d 
1148 (N.M. 2001); Ohio - Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037 
(Ohio 1993); West Virginia - Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560 
(W.V. 2003).
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states permit intentional spoliation as an independent tort in the third-party
context, but not the first party context.33
2. Negligent Spoliation
The majority of states (23) that have considered the question of 
spoliation as a tort have rejected negligent spoliation claims.34 Many states 
———————————————————————————–
33 See, e.g., Indiana - Gribben v. Wal-Mart Stores, 824 N.E.2d 349, 355 
(Indiana 2005) (not permitted in first party context); Glotzbach v. Froman, 
854 N.E.2d 337, 341 (Indiana 2006) (recognized in third party spoliation),
Thompson v. Owensby, 704. N.E.2d 134 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (recognized 
in third party context); Montana - Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 
11 (Montana 1999) (recognized in the third-party context. However, first 
party spoliation can be addressed by rules of civil procedure).
34 The following states have rejected an independent spoliation claim 
based on negligence: Alabama - Christian v. Kenneth Chandler Construction 
Co., 658 So. 2d 408, 413 (Ala. 1995); Arkansas - Goff v. Harold Ives 
Trucking Co., 27 S.W.3d 387, 391 (Ark. 2000); Arizona - Souza v. Fred 
Carries Contracts Co., 955 P.2d 3, 6 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997), Tobel v. 
Travelers Ins., 988 P.2d 148, 156 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999); California - Forbes 
v. Cty. of San Bernardino, 101 Cal. App. 4th 48, 57 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2002); Colorado - Moore v. United States Dept. of Agric. Forest Serv., 864 
F. Supp. 163 (Dist. Colo. 1994); Connecticut - Massaro v. Yale New Haven 
Hosp., 34 Conn. L. Rptr. 609 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2003); Delaware - Lucas v. 
Christiana Skating Ctr., Ltd., 722 A.2d 1247 (Del. Super. Ct. 1998); Iowa -
Meyn v. State, 594 N.W.2d 34 (Iowa 1999); Kansas - Koplin v. Rosel Well 
Perforators, Inc., 734 P.2d 1177 (Kan. 1987) (must have special 
circumstances or relationship to create the duty to preserve evidence); 
Kentucky - Monsanto Co. v. Reed, 950 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. 1997); Louisiana -
Louis v. Albertsons, 935 So. 2d 771, 775 (spoliation claim can be brought 
under traditional negligence theory); Maine - Butler v. Mooers, No. Civ. A. 
CV-00-737, 2001 WL 1708836 (Me. Super. Ct. June 13, 2001), Gagne v. 
D.E. Jonsen, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 2d 145, 147 (D. Me. 2003); Maryland -
Miller v. Montgomery Cty, 494 A.2d 761 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985); 
Massachusetts - Fletcher v. Dorchester Mutual Ins., 773 N.E.2d 420 (Mass. 
2002); Michigan - Panich v. Iron Wood Prod. Corp., 445 N.W.2d 795 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1989); Minnesota - Federated Mutual Ins. v. Litchfield Precision 
Components, Inc. 456 N.W.2d 434, 436-37 (Minn. 1990); Missouri -
Baugher v. Gates Rubber Co., 863 S.W.2d 905 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); 
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have rejected the concept of negligent spoliation under ordinary negligence 
principles, i.e., the duty to preserve evidence, breach of that duty, causation, 
and injury.35 A small minority of jurisdictions (9 states) have allowed claims 
for negligent spoliation.36 Of this small handful of jurisdictions recognizing 
negligent spoliation under ordinary negligence principles, only four 
recognize negligent spoliation for both first-party and third party claims. 37
3. Spoliation by Third Parties
Within the tort of spoliation is the controversy of whether to impose 
a duty when the spoliator is not a party to the underlying litigation.  Of the 
nine states recognizing negligent spoliation under general negligence 
principles, only five states permit negligent spoliation claims to be brought 
against third parties.38
———————————————————————————–
Mississippi - Richardson v. Sarah Lee Corp., 847 So. 2d 821, 823-24 (Miss. 
2003); Nevada - Timber Tech Engineered v. Home Ins., 55 P.3d 952 (Nev. 
2002); New York - Ortega v. City of New York, 876 N.E.2d 1189, 1197 
(N.Y. 2007); Ohio - Drawl v. Comicelli, 706 N.E.2d 849, 851-52 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1997) (however, Ohio recognizes the tort of interference with or 
destruction of evidence requiring a showing of a willful (wrongful) 
destruction, alternation or concealment of evidence); Utah - Burns v. 
Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Virginia -
Austin v. Consolidated Coal Co., 501 S.E.2d 161 (Va. 1998); Wisconsin -
Johnston v. Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins., 288 Wis.2d 658.
35 See cases cited supra note 34.
36 See infra note 37 (Illinois, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
and Pennsylvania); infra note 38 (Alabama, Florida, Indiana, Montana, 
and West Virginia).
37 The following are states that recognize negligent spoliation for both 
first-party and third-party claims under ordinary negligence principles: 
Illinois - Boyd v. Travelers Ins., 652 N.E.2d 267 (Ill. 1995); New Jersey -
Rosenblit v. Zimmerman, 766 A.2d 749, 756 (N.J. 2001), Swick v. New 
York Times, Co., 815 A.2d 508, 512 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003); New 
Mexico - Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 185 (N.M. 1995),
overruled on other grounds by Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., 34 P.3d 
1148 (N.M. 2001); Pennsylvania - Elias v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 710 A.2d 
65 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
38 The following states recognize negligent spoliation under general 
negligence principle against third-parties: Alabama - Smith v. Atkinson, 771 
So. 2d 429 (Ala. 2000) (negligence permitted against a third party who was 
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4. Policy Considerations
Liability for spoliation of evidence arises from a party’s duty to 
preserve evidence.39 Whether a duty is owed is a legal question, decided by 
the court.40 The duty element of the spoliation tort has perplexed the majority 
of courts, especially in the context of third-parties.41 There exists an 
amorphous body of negligent spoliation of evidence law that determines 
when a third-party can be liable in civil litigation.  Therefore, where adopted, 
the outcomes of such actions can be diverse depending on the state and the 
law applied.  As an example, a duty to preserve evidence before allowing 
spoliation claims under general concepts of negligence is required in three 
———————————————————————————–
the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s inability to file or win the underlying 
lawsuit); Florida - Martino v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 908 So. 2d 342, 347 
(Fla. 2005) (first party spoliation claim not recognized), Kimball v. Publix 
Super Mkt., Inc., 901 So. 2d 293, 296 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (third party 
spoliation recognized), Royal & Sunalliance v. Lauderdale Marine Ctr., 877 
So. 2d 843, 846 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (third party spoliation requires 
duty to preserve evidence)); Indiana - Gribben v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 824 
N.E.2d 349, 355 (Ind. 2005) (first party spoliation not recognized),
Glotzbach v. Froman, 854 N.E.2d 337, 341-42 (Ind. 2006) (third party 
spoliation recognized); Montana - Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 
11 (Mont. 1999); West Virginia - Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560 (W. Va. 
2003).
39 See, e.g., Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 573 So. 2d 24, 27-28 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1990).
40 Manorcare Health Servs., Inc. v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 764 
A.2d 475, 479 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (holding the duty to preserve 
evidence is a question of law for the court).
41 See, e.g., Fletcher v. Dorchester Mut. Ins. Co., 773 N.E.2d 420, 424-
25 (Mass. 2002) (“Persons who are not themselves parties to litigation do not 
have a duty to preserve evidence for use by others. Nonparty witnesses may 
have evidence relevant to a case – documents, photographs, tape recordings, 
equipment parts, or any other tangible objects – and may know of its 
relevance, but that knowledge, by itself, does not give rise to a duty to 
cooperate with litigants.”); See Metlife Auto & Home v. Joe Basil Chevrolet, 
Inc., 753 N.Y.S.2d 272 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (holding spoliator’s 
knowledge of a potential or current lawsuit did not impose a duty to preserve 
evidence). But see, Mace v. Ford Motor Co., 653 S.E.2d 660 (W. Va. 2007).
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states. 42 One court found that a duty to preserve evidence existed where the 
duty arose out of “agreement, contract, statute, special circumstance, or 
voluntary undertaking” and required an objective foreseeability element 
where a reasonable person could have foreseen that the evidence in question 
was material to a potential civil action.43
Absent clear legislative direction in determining whether a 
cognizable duty should exist, courts have focused on a variety of policy 
considerations for refusing to recognize an independent spoliation tort, such 
as: (1) the fact that remedies are already in place to rectify the problem;44 (2) 
the damages produced are inherently speculative;45 (3) adjudicated matters 
———————————————————————————–
42 See Florida - Royal & Sun Alliance, 877 So.2d at 846 (third party 
spoliation requires a duty to preserve evidence); Illinois – Dardeen
v. Kuehling, 821 N.E.2d 227, 231 (Ill. 2004) (duty to preserve evidence 
required); New Mexico - Coleman, 905 P.2d (special circumstances must 
exist under which there is a duty to preserve the evidence).
43 See Dardeen, 821 N.E.2d at 231.
44 See Reynolds v. Bordelon, 172 So. 3d 589 (La. 2015).
45 “It seems likely that in a substantial proportion of spoliation cases the 
fact of harm will be irreducibly uncertain. In these cases, ‘there will typically 
be no way of telling what precisely the evidence would have shown and how 
much it would have weighed in the spoliation victim's favor.’ The elements 
of causation and damages, therefore, in the continuing absence of 
the spoliated evidence, would be nearly impossible to prove, and permitting 
a cause of action that necessarily would be based upon speculation and 
conjecture could burden the courts with claims that may be peculiarly 
productive of arbitrary and unreliable verdicts.” Temple Cmty. Hosp. v. 
Super. Ct. of Los Angeles, 976 P.2d 223, 228 (Cal. 1999) (citing Cedars-
Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Super. Ct. of Los Angeles, 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998). See
also Smith v. Super. Ct. of Los Angeles, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 833-34 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1984), overruled by Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 954 P.2d (recognizing 
that the damages for spoliation tort were inherently speculative because, in 
order to state a claim, the relevant evidence must be missing but finding it 
would be a great injustice to prevent an injured party from recovering at 
all, then to reduce the certainty of damages requirements); Reilly PPA 
v. D'Errico, No.. CV93 0346095S, 1994 WL 547671, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
Sept. 21, 1994) (Stating that “the inherently speculative nature of the 
spoliation tort militates against adopting such a cause of action”); Larison v. 
City of Trenton, 180 F.R.D. 261, 265-66 (D.N.J. 1998) (failing to adopt 
an independent spoliation tort partly because the court was unwilling “to 
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may need to be re-litigated;46 (4) there is the potential for jury confusion and 
inconsistency;47 and, (5) there is always the possibility of interfering with a 
person’s private property rights.48 However, the bulk of the case law on this 
subject focuses upon the availability of alternative remedies to rectify the 
spoliation problem.49
———————————————————————————–
engage in speculation and conjecture” in regards to the damages 
requirement).
46 See, e.g., Temple Cmty. Hosp., 976 P.2d at 228 (Cal. 1999) (“[I]f the 
spoliation claim were brought after the conclusion of the underlying 
litigation, the result would be ‘duplicative proceedings’ involving a ‘retrial 
within a trial’ and carrying the potential for inconsistent results.”).
47 See Edwards v. Louisville Ladder Co., 796 F. Supp. 966, 971 (W.D. La. 
1992); Murphy v. Target Prods., 580 N.E.2d 687, 690 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1991); Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950, 957 (Tex. 1998); Cedars-Sinai Med. 
Ctr., 954 P.2d 511; Id. at 518. (“Without knowing the content and weight of 
the spoliated evidence, it would be impossible for the jury to meaningfully 
assess what role the missing evidence would have played in the 
determination of the underlying action.”); Reilly, 1994 WL 547671, at 
*6; Reynolds, 172 So. 3d at 598 (a spoliation tort “could create confusion for 
fact-finders, particularly juries, inasmuch as it allows a trial within a 
trial.”); Temple Cmty. Hosp., 976 P.2d at 228 (“if the spoliation claim were 
tried concurrently with the underlying litigation, there would be ‘a 
significant potential for jury confusion and inconsistency’... ”.).
48 See, e.g., id. at 228 (Cal. 1999) (“[T]he threat of liability might cause 
individuals and entities to engage in unnecessary and expensive record-
retention policies.”); Louisville Ladder Co., 796 F. Supp. at 970
(“[C]ourts must also be concerned with interference with a person's right to 
dispose of his own property as he chooses.”); Koplin v. Rosel Well 
Perforators, Inc., 734 P.2d 1177, 1183 (Kan. 1987) (recognizing an 
independent spoliation tort would cause “[T]he unwarranted intrusion on the 
property rights of a person who lawfully disposes of his own property.”).
49 See, e.g., Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp., 501 N.E.2d 1312, 1319 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (discussing that sanctions for spoliation of evidence in 
violation of discovery rules promote orderly judicial procedures and fair 
play); Cedars–Sinai, 954 P.2d 511 (emphasizing that sanctions within the 
original proceeding, disciplinary and penal sanctions are preferable in 
derivative litigation).
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III. DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO DISINCENTIVIZING THE 
SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE
Although some jurisdictions have begun to recognize a new, 
independent tort for the spoliation of evidence in civil litigation, a majority 
of courts have found the adoption of an independent tort is unnecessary due 
to a variety of existing non-tort remedies and sanctions already in place 
acting as effective measures in addressing the misconduct of spoliation.50
Traditionally, courts utilized adverse inferences, presumptions, and other 
actions as the main determents in preventing a party from destroying 
evidence.  
Finding that the additional benefits of a tort remedy are not great in 
comparison to the significant burdens it would create, various courts have 
employed a myriad of traditional remedies to combat spoliation.51 Any 
remedy a court imposes should serve one of three purposes:  deterrence, 
punishment, or remediation52 and the evidence allegedly lost or destroyed 
must be relevant to a material fact in the litigation.53 To fix pre-litigation 
spoliation, state courts have relied on their inherent power to control the 
———————————————————————————–
50 See, e.g., Miller v. Montgomery Cty., 494 A.2d 761, 768 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 1985) (“In either event, the remedy for the alleged spoliation 
would be appropriate jury instructions as to permissible inferences, not a 
separate and collateral action.”).
51 See, e.g., Telecom Int'l America, Ltd. v. AT&T Corp., 67 F. Supp. 2d 189 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting that dismissal may be an appropriate remedy where a 
party demonstrates bad faith in the destruction of evidence); See Telectron, Inc. 
v. Overhead Door Corp., 116 F.R.D. 107, 128 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (entering a 
default judgment when documents were willfully destroyed causing 
prejudice to the case); Metropolitan Dade County v. Bermudez, 648 So. 2d 
197, 200 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (weighing the willfulness and extent of 
prejudice in deciding the appropriate sanctions for the destruction of 
evidence); Farley Metals, Inc. v. Barber Colman Co., 645 N.E.2d 964, 968 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (holding that where critical information is destroyed, the 
prejudice to the non-offending party is the courts focus for imposing 
sanctions).
52 See, e.g., National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 
427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976) (“[T]he most severe in the spectrum of 
sanctions … must be available … not merely to penalize those whose 
conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to deter those who 
might be tempted to such conduct in the absence of such a deterrent.”).
53 Gath v. M/A-COM, Inc., 802 N.E.2d 521, 528 (Mass. 2003).
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judicial process in litigation54 and to sanction parties for the spoliation of 
evidence.55 Courts have broad discretion in imposing sanctions for the 
———————————————————————————–
54 Chambers v. Nasco Inc., 501 U.S. 32; Dillon v. Nissan Motor Co., 986 
F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding that court has inherent power in excluding 
plaintiff’s experts’ testimony where the expert failed to preserve 
evidence); Unigard Security Insurance Co. v. Lakewood Eng. & Manuf. 
Corp., 982 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1992) (excluding testimony of plaintiff’s expert 
without showing of bad faith was proper use of court’s inherent powers); 
Northern Assurance Co. v. Ware, 145 F.R.D. 281 (D. Me. 1993).
55 The following states have the inherent power to sanction parties for the 
spoliation of evidence: Alabama - Story v. RAJ Prop., Inc., 909 So. 2d 797, 802-
03 (Ala. 2005); Arizona - Souza v. Fred Carries Contracts, Inc., 955 P.2d 3, 6 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1997); Arkansas - Goff v. Harold Ives Trucking Co., 27 S.W.3d 
387, 391 (Ark. 2000); California - Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Super. Ct., 954 
P.2d 511, 517 (Cal. 1998); Colorado - Pfantz v. KMart Corp., 85 P.3d 564, 567 
(Colo. App. 2003); Connecticut - Beers v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 675 A.2d 829, 
832 (Conn. 1996); Delaware - Burris v. Kay Bee Toy Stores, No. 96C-01-036, 
1999 WL 1240863 at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 17, 1999); Florida - Martino v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 908 So. 2d 342, 347 (Fla. 2005); Georgia - Chicago
Hardway & Fixture Co. v. Letterman, 510 S.E.2d 875 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999); 
Hawaii - Stender v. Vincent, 992 P.2d 50 (Haw. 2000); Idaho - Courtney v. 
Big O Tires, 87 P.3d 930, 933 (Idaho 2003); Illinois - Adams v. Bath & Body 
Works, Inc., 830 N.E.2d 645, 652 – 53 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); Indiana - Glotzbach 
v. Froman, 827 N.E.2d 105, 112 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Iowa - Mayn v. State, 594 
N.W.2d 31, 34 (Iowa 1999); Kansas - Shay v. State Dept. of Transp., 959 P.2d 
849, 851 (Kan. 1998); Kentucky - Morten v. Bank of the Bluegrass & Trust Co., 
18 S.W.3d 353, 360 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999); Louisiana - Smith v. Jitney Jungle 
of Am., 802 So. 2d 988, 992 (La. Ct. App. 2001); Maine - Driggin v. 
Am. Sec. Alarm Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 113 (D. Me. 2000); Maryland -
Klupt v. Krongard, 728 A.2d 727, 736 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999); 
Massachusetts - Gath v. M/A-Comm, Inc., 802 N.E.2d 521 (Mass. 2003); 
Michigan - Bloemendaal v. Town & Country Sports Ctr., Inc., 659 N.W.2d 684 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2002); Minnesota - Patton v. Newmar Corp., 538 N.W.2d 116
(Minn. 1995); Mississippi - Dowdle Butane Gas Co. v. Moore, 831 So.2d 1124, 
1127 (Miss. 2002); Montana - Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11, 17-
18 (Mont. 1999); Nebraska - In re Estate of Schindler, 582 N.W.2d 369, 379 
(Neb. Ct. App. 1998); Nevada - Banks ex. rel. Banks v. Sunrise Hosp., 102 P.3d 
52, 58 (Nev. 2004); New Hampshire - Mayes v. Black & Decker (U.S), Inc., 
931 F. Supp. 80, 83 (D.N.H. 1996); New Jersey - Jerista v. Murray, 883 A.2d 
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spoliation of evidence.56 Federal District Courts have relied on their inherent 
authority to impose sanctions to help combat spoliation.57 However, the 
United States Supreme Court has cautioned District Courts to exercise 
restraint in the use of their inherent power for imposing sanctions.58
The most commonly utilized sanction is an adverse inference jury 
instruction to attempt to cure prejudice involving spoliated evidence.59 Many 
———————————————————————————–
350 (N.J. 2005); New Mexico - Segura v. K-Mart Corp., 62 P.3d 283, 286 
(N.M. Ct. App. 2002); New York - Kirkland v. New York City Hous. Auth., 
666 N.Y.S.2d 609, 611 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); North Carolina - Bumgarner v. 
Reneau, 422 S.E.2d 686, 689 (N.C. 1992); North Dakota - Bachmeier v.
Wallwork Truck Centers, 544 N.W.2d 122, 124 (N.D. 1996); Ohio - Simeone 
v. Girard City Bd. of Educ., 872 N.E.2d 344 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007); Oklahoma -
Barnett v. Simmons, 197 P.3d 12 (Okla. 2008); Pennsylvania - Schroeder v. Pa. 
Dep’t. of Transp., 710 A.2d 23, 27 (Pa. 1998); Rhode Island - Farrell 
v. Connetti Trailer Sales, Inc., 727 A.2d 183, 187 (R.I. 1999); South Carolina -
Kershaw Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 396 S.E.2d 369, 372 
(S.C. 1990); South Dakota - State v. Engesser, 661 N.W.2d 739, 754 
(S.D. 2003); Tennessee - Thurman-Bryant Elec. Supply Co. v. Unisys 
Corp., No. 03A01-CV00152, 1991 WL 222256 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991); Texas -
Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. 1998); Virginia - Gentry v. Toyota 
Motor Corp., 471 S.E.2d 485, 488 (Va. 1996); Washington - Henderson v. 
Tyrrell, 910 P.2d 522 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996); West Virginia - Hannah v. Heeter, 
584 S.E.2d 560 (W. Va. 2003); Wisconsin - Garfoot v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 
599 N.W.2d 411, 422 – 23 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999); Wyoming - Abraham v. 
Great W. Energy, LLC, 101 P.3d 446, 456 (Wyo. 2004).
56 See Hirsch v. General Motors Corp., 628 A.2d 1108, 1126 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Law Div. 1993) (“[A] district court has wide discretion in imposing 
discovery sanctions…”).
57 See, e.g., Carlucci v. Piper Air Craft Corp., 775 F.2d 1440, 1447 (11th 
Cir. 1985); Capellupo v. FMC Corp., 126 F.R.D. 545, 551 (D. Minn. 1989).
58 Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980).
59 The following states provide for an adverse jury instruction: Alabama -
Vesta First Ins. v. Milam & Co. Constr., Inc., 901 So. 2d 84, 93 (Ala. 2004), Smith 
v. Atkinson, 771 So. 2d 429, 438 (Ala. 2000); Alaska - Sweet v. Sisters of 
Providence in Washington, 895 P.2d 484 (Alaska 1995); Arizona - Smyser v. City 
of Peoria, 160 P.3d 1186 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); Arkansas - Goff v. Harold Ives,
27 S.W.3d at 391); California - Cedars-Sinai, 954 P.2d at 514; Colorado - Aloi v. 
Union Pac. RR Corp., 129 P.3d 999, 1003 (Colo. 2006); Connecticut -
Bayliner Marine Corp., 675 A.2d at 832; Delaware - Collins v. Throckmorton, 
425 A.2d 146, 150 (Del. 1980), Lucas v. Christiana Skating Ctr., Ltd., 722 A.2d 
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1247 (Del. Super. Ct. 1998); Florida - Martino, 908 So. 2d at 347; Georgia -
Baxley v. Hakiel Inds., Inc., 647 S.E.2d 29, 30 (Ga. 2007); Hawaii - Stender, 992 
P.2d 50; Idaho - Big O Tires, 87 P.3d at 933, 933; Illinois - R.J. Mgmt. Co. v. 
SRLB Dev. Corp., 806 N.E.2d 1074, 1081 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); Indiana -
Gribben v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 824 N.E.2d 349 (Ind. 2005); Iowa - Lynch v. 
Sadler, 656 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 2003); Kansas - In Re Grisell’s Estate, 270 P.2d 
285 (Kan. 1954); Kentucky - Monsanto Co. v. Reed, 950 S.W.2d 811, 815 (Ky. 
1997), Tinsley v. Jackson, 771 S.W.2d 331, 332 (Ky. 1989); Louisiana -
Desselle v. Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist., No. 2, 887 So.2d 524, 534 (La. Ct. App. 
2004); Maine - Driggin, 141 F. Supp. 2d; Maryland - Miller v. Montgomery Cty., 
494 A.2d 761 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985), Anderson v. Litzenberg, 694 A.2d 150 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997); Massachusetts - M/A-Com, 802 N.E.2d 521; 
Michigan - Ward v. Consol. Rail Corp., 693 N.W.2d 366, 371-72 (Mich. 2005); 
Minnesota - Federated Mutual Insurance Co. v. Litchfield Precision Components, 
Inc., 456 N.W.2d 434, 436 – 37 (Minn. 1990); Mississippi - Richardson v. Norfolk 
Southern Ry Co., 923 So.2d 1002, 1015-16 (Miss. 2006); Missouri - Baldridge v. 
Dir. of Revenue, State of Missouri, 82 S.W.3d 212, 223 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002); 
Montana - Livingston v. Isuzu Motors Ltd., 910 F. Supp. 1473 (D. Montana 
1995); Nebraska - State v. Davlin, 639 N.W.2d 631, 648 (Neb. 2002); Nevada -
Bass-Davis v. Davis, 134 P.3d 103 (Nev. 2006) (En Banc); New Hampshire -
Murray v. Dev. Serv. of Sullivan Cty., 818 A.2d 302, 309 (N.H. 2003); New 
Jersey - Jerista v. Murray, 883 A.2d 350 (N.J. 2005); New Mexico - Torres v. El 
Paso Electric Co., 987 P.2d 386 (N.M. 1999) (overruled on other grounds 
by Herrera v. Quality Pontiac, 73 P.3d 181 (N.M. 2003); New York - Laffin v.
Ryan, 162 N.Y.S.2d 730, 736 (N.Y. App. Div. 1957), DiDomenico v. C & 
S Aeromatik Supplies, 682 NYS.2d 452, 495 (NY App. Div. 1998); North 
Carolina - Red Hill Hosier Mill, Inc. v. Magna Tek, Inc., 530 S.E.2d 321 (NC Ct. 
App. 2000), McLain v. Taco Bell Corp., 527 S.E.2d 712 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000); 
North Dakota - Krueger v. North American Creameries, 27 N.W.2d 240, 244 
(N.D. 1947); Ohio - Bright v. Ford Motor Co., 578 N.E.2d 547, 549 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1990); Oklahoma - Manpower, Inc. v. Brawdy, 62 P.3d 391, 392 (Okla. Civ. 
App. 2002); Oregon - Whitney v. Canadian Bank of Commerce, 374 P.2d 441 
(Or. 1962), Steffens v. Bohlman, 909 P.2d 208, 211 (Or. Ct. App. 
1996); Pennsylvania - Schroeder, 710 A.2d at 28); Rhode Island -
Connetti Trailer Sales, 727 A.2d at 187; South Carolina - U.S. Gypsum Co., 396 
S.E.2d 369; South Dakota - First Premier Bank v. Kolcraft Enter., Inc., 686 
N.W.2d 430, 448 (S.D. 2004); Tennessee - Bronson v. Umphries, 138 S.W.3d 
844, 854 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003); Texas - Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. 
1998); Vermont - F.R. Patch Mfr. Co. v. Protection Lodge No. 215, Int’l SASS’s 
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states have pattern jury instructions that address spoliation of evidence. 60
All of the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals have permitted adverse 
inference jury instructions.61
———————————————————————————–
of Machinists, 60A. 74, 84 (Vt. 1909); Virginia - Wolfe v. Virginia Birth-Related 
Neurological Injury Comp Program, 580 S.E.2d 467 (Va. Ct. App. 
2003); Washington - Henderson, 910 P.2d); West Virginia - Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 
560; Wisconsin - Jagmin v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 211 N.W.2d 810, 821 (Wis. 
1973), Estate of Neumann ex. rel. Rodli v. Neumann, 626 N.W.2d 821, 842 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 2001); Wyoming - Great Western Energy, LLC, 101 P.3d at 456).
60 See, e.g., Alabama - ALABAMA PRACTICE SERIES, ALABAMA PATTERN JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS – Civil §§ 15.12, 15.13 (3d ed. 2016); Arkansas - ARK. MODEL JURY 
INSTRUCTION CIV. AMI106, https://courts.arkansas.gov/content/arkansas-model-
jury-instructions-civil (last visited Oct. 13, 2017); California CAL. EVID. CODE § 413; 
CAL. CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CACI § 204: Willful Suppression of Evidence (Oct. 
2004), https://www.justia.com/trials-litigation/docs/caci/200/204.html; and 
CALIFORNIA CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, BAJI § 2.03 https://1.next.westlaw.com/ 
Document/I18a11ba3f99011db8d9185e38c2a1528/View/FullText.html?transitionTy
pe=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)); Delaware - DEL. PATTERN JURY 
INSTRUCTION §23.17, http://courts.delaware.gov/forms/download.aspx?id=85928) 
(2006); Illinois - Ill. Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 5.01 (4th ed. 2017); Indiana - 
1-500 Ind. Model Civil Jury Instructions 535 (2016); Kansas - 
Kan. Pattern Jury Instruction 3d, § 1.02.73; Maryland - MPJI-Cv. 1:8 
(2017); Michigan - WILLIAM B. MURPHY & JOHN VANDENHOMBERGH, 
MICHIGAN NONSTANDARD CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS §§ 3:3, 3:4 (Lawyers 
Cooperative Publishing, 2017); M Civ. JI 2d 6.01(c) and (d); Minnesota (4 
Minn. Prac., Jury Instr. Guides--Civil CIVJIG 12.35 (6th ed.); New Mexico - 
NMRA, Civ. UJI 13-1650, 1651); New York - ASSOCIATION OF JUSTICES OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, COMMITTEE ON PATTERN JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS, NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL 1:77 (Lawyers 
Cooperative Publishing, 2017 ed. 2016); Ohio - OHIO CIVIL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS Cv. 437.01 (LexisNexis, 2009); Pennsylvania - Pa. SSJI (Civ) 
5.60 (2008); Tennessee - COMMITTEE ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 
TENNESSEE PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS – CIVIL 2.04 (Thomas West, 17th ed. 
2017). Two States indicate no jury instruction should be given. See, Colorado - 
The Supreme Court of Colorado, Colorado Jury Instructions – Civil 3:13 
(LexisNexis 4th ed. 2016) (no instruction to be given; Oklahoma - OUJI 3d (Rev. 
2009) § 3.11) (no instruction should be given).
61 First Circuit - Testa v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 173, 177 (1st 
Cir. 1998), Nation-wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distrib., Inc., 692 F.2d 
214, 217 (1st Cir. 1982); Second Circuit - Residential Funding Corp. v. 
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Other deterrents exist to ensure that relevant evidence is available at 
trial.  While appellate courts have provided guidance to the trial court as to 
when a sanction for spoliation of evidence is appropriate,62 the imposition of 
sanctions is often left to the discretion of the trial court.63
———————————————————————————–
DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 2002), Byrnie v. Town of 
Cromwell Bd. of Educ., 243 F.3d 93, 107 (2nd Cir. 2001); Third Circuit -
Schmid v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76 (3d Cir. 1994), Brewer 
v. Quaker State Oil Refining Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 334 (3d Cir. 1995); Fourth 
Circuit - Horton v. Synthes, 148 F. App’x 145, 156 (2005 WL 1240346 *1 
(4th Cir. May, 25, 2005), Hodge v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 360 F.3d 446, 450 
(4th Cir. 2004); Fifth Circuit - King v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 337 F.3d 550, 556 
(5th Cir. 2003); Sixth Circuit - Rogers v. T.J. Samson Cmty. Hosp., 276 F.3d 
228, 232 (6th Cir. 2002); Seventh Circuit - Park v. City of Chicago, 297 F.3d 
606, 615 (7th Cir. 2002) (see also 7th Cir. Pattern Jury Instruction 
1.20); Eighth Circuit - Johnson v. Reddy Mixed Concrete Co., 424 F.3d 806, 
811 (8th Cir. 2005); Ninth Circuit - Milbourn v. Marriott, No. 94-35142, 
1995 WL 555722, at *3 (9th Cir. Sept. 15, 1995); Tenth Circuit -
Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1409 (10th Cir. 1997); Eleventh 
Circuit - Penalty Kick Mgmt. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co., 318 F.3d 1284, 1294 
(11th Cir. 2003).
62 See, e.g., Fleury v. Biomet, Inc., 865 So. 2d 537, 539 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2003) (“[T]he appropriate sanction varies according to the willfulness or bad 
faith, if any, of the party who lost the evidence, the extent of the prejudice 
suffered by the other party, and what is required to cure the 
prejudice.”); Bachmeier v. Wallwork Truck Centers, 544 N.W.2d 122, 124-
25 (N.D. 1996); American States Insurance Co. v. Tokai-Seiki 
(H.K.), Ltd., 704 N.E.2d 1280, 1283 (1997); Farrell v. Connetti Trailer Sales, 
Inc., 727 A.2d 183, 187 (RI 1999); Milwaukee Constructors II v. Milwaukee 
Metropolitan Sewerage Dist., 502 N.W.2d 881, 884 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1993); Henderson v. Tyrrell, 910 P.2d 522 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996); Hannah v. 
Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560 (W. Va. 2003).
63 See, e.g., Chicago Hardware & Fixture Co. v. Letterman, 510 S.E.2d 
875 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999); Stender v. Vincent, 992 P.2d 50 
(Haw. 2000); Morton v. Bank of the Bluegrass & Tr. Co., 18 S.W.3d 353, 
360 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999); Kirkland v. New York City Hous. Auth., 666 
N.Y.S.2d 609, 611 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); Thurman-Bryant Elec. Supply 
Co., Inc. v. Unisys Corp., Inc. No. 03A01-CV-00152, 1991 WL 222256 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
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As an alternative to bringing an independent case for negligent 
spoliation of evidence, some courts have permitted a party to pursue 
discovery sanctions for the spoliation of evidence within a pending lawsuit.64
In addition to discovery sanctions, the trial court can order dismissal of the 
case,65 enter a default judgment,66 strike pleadings,67 grant summary
———————————————————————————–
64 See, e.g., Shimanovsky v. Gen. Motors Corp., 692 N.E.2d 286, 289 
(Ill. 1998); Adams v. Bath & Body Works, 830 N.E.2d 645, 654 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2005).
65 See, e.g., Souza v. Fred Carries Contracts, Inc., 955 P.2d 3, 5-6 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1997); Cedars Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 517 
(Cal. 1998); Burris v. Kay Bee Toy Stores No. 96C-01-036, 1999 WL 
1240863 at *1 (Del. Sup. Ct. September 17, 1999); Adams v. Bath & Body 
Works, Inc., 830 N.E.2d 645, 652-653 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); Driggin v. 
American Security Alarm Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 113 (Dist. Me. 2000); Gath 
v. M/A-Com, Inc., 802 N.E.2d 521 (Mass. 2003); Bloemendaal v. Town & 
Country Sports Ctr., Inc., 659 N.W.2d 684 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002); Banks 
ex. rel Banks v. Sunrise Hosp., 102 P.3d 52, 58 (Nev. 2004); Hirsch v. 
General Motors Corp., 628 A.2d 1108, 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1993); Kirkland, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 611; Barnett v. Simmons, 197 P.3d 12 
(Okla. 2008); Kershaw Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 396 S.E.2d 
369, 372 (S.C. 1990); Morrison v. Rankin, 738 N.W.2d 588 (Wis. Ct. App. 
2007); Abraham v. Great Western Energy, LLC, 101 P.3d 446, 456 (Wyo. 
2004).
66 See, e.g., Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 102 F.R.D. 472 (S.D. Fla. 
1984) (entry of default judgment against defendant who intentionally 
destroyed relevant documents); Sponco Mfg., Inc. v. Alcover, 656 So. 2d
629, 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a default judgment against 
a civil defendant who intentionally destroyed evidence essential to the 
plaintiff's case was appropriate); Mercer v. Raine, 443 So. 2d 944, 946 (Fla. 
1983) (“[D]eliberate and contumacious disregard of the court's authority will 
justify [the striking of pleadings or entering a default], as will bad faith, 
willful disregard or gross indifference to an order of the court, or conduct 
which evinces deliberate callousness.”); Rockwell Int'l. Corp. v. Menzies, 
561 So. 2d 677, 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (finding no bad faith in the 
defendant's intentional destruction of evidence, however still affirming a 
default judgment against the defendant).
67 See, e.g., Kirkland, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 611; Kershaw Cty. Bd. of 
Educ. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 396 S.E.2d 369, 372 (S.C. 1990).
2017                   RESOLVING THIRD-PARTY INSURANCE
                    COMPANY AUTOMOBILE SPOLIATION CLAIMS  
 
85
judgment,68 grant continuances,69 issue contempt orders,70 order evidence 
preclusion,71 order expert witness preclusion,72 award attorneys’ fees,73 allow 
punitive damages,74 allow awards of the compensatory damages that would 
have been available if the claimant had won at trial,75 make referrals for 
———————————————————————————–
68 See, e.g., Story v. RAJ Properties, Inc., 909 So.2d 797, 802-803 (Ala. 
2005); Beers v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 675 A.2d 829, 831-34 (Conn. 
1996); Burris v. Kay Bee Toy Stores, No. 96C-01-036 1999 WL 1240863 at *1 
(Del. Sup. Ct. September 17, 1999); Bachmeier v. Walwork Truck Ctrs., 544 
N.W.2d 122, 124 (N.D. 1996); Creazzo v. Medtronic, Inc., 903 A.2d 24, 29 (Pa. 
Sup. Ct. 2006); Abraham v. Great Western Energy, LLC, 101 P.3d 446, 456 
(Wyo. 2004).
69 See, e.g., Bumgarner v. Reneau, 422 S.E.2d 686 (N.C. 1992).
70 See, e.g., Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. 954 P.2d 511, 517 (Cal. 1998); Dowdle 
Butane Gas Co. v. Moore, 831 So.2d 1124, 1127 (Miss. 2002).
71 See, e.g., Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Synergy Gas, Inc., 585 So. 2d 822, 826-
28 (Ala. 1991); see also Cedars-Sinai, 954 P.2d at 517; Driggin v. American Sec. 
Alarm Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 113, 120 (Dist. Me. 2000); Gath v. M/A-Com, 
Inc., 802 N.E.2d 521, 527 (Mass. 2003); Bloemendaal v. Town & Country Sports 
Ctr., Inc., 959 N.W.2d 684 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002); In Re Estate of Schindler, 582 
N.W.2d 369, 379 (Neb. Ct. App. 1998); Bumgarner, 422. S.E.2d at 689.
72 See, e.g., Patton v. Newmar Corp., 538 N.W.2d 116, 118-19 (Minn. 
1995); Loukinas v. Roto-Router Serv. Co., 167 Ohio App. 3d 559, 2006-Ohio-
3172, 855 N.E.2d 1272, at ¶ 13; Holm-Waddle v. William D. Hawley, M.D., Inc., 
1998 OK 53, ¶¶ 6-10, 967 P.2d 1180, 1182; Abraham, 2004 WY at ¶ 21-22, 101 
P.3d at 456 (Wyo. 2004).
73 See, e.g., Grubbs v. Knoll, 870 A.2d 713, 719-21 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2005); In Re Prudential Ins. Co. Sales Prac. Litig., 169 F.R.D. 598, 
617 (D.N.J. 1997).
74 See, e.g., Smith v. Atkinson, 771 So. 2d 429, 438 (Ala. 2000); Moskovitz 
v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 635 N.E.2d 331, 344 (Ohio 1994); Hannah v. Heeter, 584 
S.E.2d 560, 573 (W. Va. 2003).
75 See, e.g., Rizzuto v. Davidson Ladders, Inc., 905 A.2d 1165 (Conn. 
2006) (intentional first party spoliation); Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp., 501 
N.E.2d 1312, 1320 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (“Assuming that it is impossible to know 
what the spoliated evidence would have shown, perhaps the plaintiff should be 
awarded the full measure of damages that he would have obtained had he won the 
underlying lawsuit.”).
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criminal prosecution,76 issue criminal penalties,77 and make a referral for 
attorney disciplinary action.78 Courts that have declined to recognize an 
independent spoliation tort have found the foregoing options sufficiently 
effective to deter potential spoliation.79 However, proponents of the 
———————————————————————————–
76 See, e.g., Downen v. Redd, 242 S.W.3d 273, 275 (Ark. 2006); Goff v. 
Harrold Ives Trucking Co., 27 S.W.3d 287, 391 (Ark. 2000); Cedars-Sinai Med. 
Ctr., 954 P.2d at 517.
77 The following states have statutes in which courts can impose criminal 
penalties for spoliation of evidence: Alabama - ALA. CODE § 13A-10-129 (2004); 
Alaska - ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.610 (2004); Arizona - ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-
2809 (2003); Arkansas - ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-53-110 and 5-53-111 (2014); 
California - CAL. PENAL CODE § 135 (West 2016); Colorado - COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-8-610 (2017); Connecticut - CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53A-155 (2015); 
Delaware - DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1269 (2) (2004); Florida - FLA.
STAT. § 918.13 (2017); Georgia - GA. CODE ANN. § 16-10-50(a) (2017); Hawaii 
- HAW. REV. STAT. § 710-1076 (2003); Idaho - IDAHO CODE § 18-2603 (2017); 
Illinois - 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/31-4 (2013); Indiana - IND. CODE § 35-44-3-4
(2004) (repealed 2012); Iowa - IOWA CODE § 719.3(1) (2013); Kentucky - KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 524.100 (West 2017); Louisiana - LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:130.1
(2016); Maine - ME. STAT. tit. 17-A § 455 (2016); Maryland - MD. CODE ANN.
CRIM. LAW § 9-307 (LexisNexis 2017); Minnesota - MINN. STAT. § 609.63(7) 
(2017); Mississippi - MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-9-125 (2000); Missouri - MO. REV.
STAT. § 575.100 (2004); Montana - MONT. CODE. ANN. § 45-7-207 (2015); 
Nebraska - NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-922(1) (2017); Nevada - NEV. REV.
STAT. § 199.220 (2017); New Hampshire - N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 641:6 
(2017); New Jersey - N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:28-6 (West 2017); New Mexico -
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-22-5 (2017); New York - N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.40 
(McKinney 2017); North Carolina - N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-221.1 (2017); Ohio -
OHIO REV. CODE § 2921.12 (West 2017); Oklahoma - OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 454 
(2003); Oregon - OR. REV. STAT. § 162.295 (2015); Pennsylvania - 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 5105 (2017) (not applicable in civil cases); South Dakota - S.D. CODIFIED 
LAW § 19-7-14 (2003); Tennessee - TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-16-503 (2017);
Texas - TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 37.09 (West 2017); Utah - UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-8-510.5 (LexisNexis 2017); Virginia - VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-260.1 
(2017); Washington - WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.72.150 (2017); West Virginia -
W.VA. CODE § 61-5-27(b)(4) (2016); Wisconsin - WIS. STAT. § 946.60 
(2017); Wyoming - WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-5-202 (2004).
78 See, e.g., Cedars-Sinai, 954 P.2d at 518; Dowdle Butane Gas Co. v. 
Moore, 2000-IA-01884-SCT (¶ 8) (Miss. 2002), 831 So. 2d 1124, 1127.
79 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Bordelon, 172 So. 3d 589 (La. 2015).
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independent tort’s recognition criticize these traditional remedies arguing 
that they fail to adequately address willful spoliation and the suppression of 
evidence impacts the proper adjudication of claims.80 One commentator has 
argued, “traditional procedural and nonprocedural remedies are flawed by 
their limited scope, their inadequate preventive effect, and their failure to
provide the victim with just compensation.”81
Where the spoliator is not a party in the underlying suit,82 court 
sanctions do little to deter spoliation.  Adverse inferences, default judgments 
and stricken pleadings do not apply to third-party spoliators.83
Despite the continuing efforts of parties seeking an adequate remedy 
for spoliation problems, courts are struggling with the question of whether 
there should be a tort for third-party spoliation of evidence, and, if so, what 
the scope of the tort should be. While legal scholars fervently debate over 
the proper methodology to resolve these conflicts, courts have developed a 
body of case law discussing the issues relating to the adoption of an 
independent spoliation of evidence tort claim on third-parties.
———————————————————————————–
80 Barker v. Bledsoe, 85 F.R.D. 545, 547-48 (W.D. Okla. 1979). See 
also Dale. A. Nance, Missing Evidence, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 831, 862 (1991) 
(arguing that the interest in proper adjudication outweighs the suppression of 
evidence).
81 Nolte, supra note 11, at 355.
82 See, e.g., Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 710 A.2d 846, 849 (D.C. 
1998) (discussing situations in which the spoliator is a third party) 
(“[A]dverse inference against the spoliator would serve no purpose.”); Elias 
v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 710 A.2d 65 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1998) (“[T]raditional remedies would be unavailing, since the spoliator is 
not a party to the underlying litigation.”). But see Temple Cmty. Hosp. v. 
Sup. Ct., 976 P.2d 223, 232 (Cal. 1999) (“We do not believe that the 
distinction between the sanctions available to victims of first party and third 
party spoliation should lead us to employ the burdensome and inaccurate 
instrument of derivative tort litigation in the case of third party spoliation.”).
83 See Cedars-Sinai, 954 P.2d at 521 n.4 (Cal. 1998) (declining to 
address whether the independent tort for the intentional spoliation of 
evidence against a third party the underlying civil litigation should also be
struck); Holmes, 710 A.2d at 848 (D.C. 1998); Callahan v. Stanley Works, 
703 A.2d 1014, 1017 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1997) (stating that 
recognition of the tort would signal “acceptable societal 
behavior.”); Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 185, 189 (N.M. 1995).
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IV. INSURANCE COMPANIES ACTING AS A THIRD-PARTY IN 
THE NEGLIGENT SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE CONTEXT
Third-party spoliators are oftentimes insurance companies entrusted 
with the investigation of evidence related to the underlying action.84
Recently, insurance companies have come into the crosshairs of claimants 
who argue that insurance companies should owe independent duties to 
policyholders/insureds and be held liable to policyholders/insureds for 
negligent spoliation of evidence.  Courts and practitioners have wrestled with 
spoliation of evidence in the context of civil litigation when the alleged 
spoliator is an insurance company.  Acting as a third party, an insurance 
company is placed in a unique position when it comes to the negligent
spoliation of evidence tort.  As an example, insurance companies regularly 
modify or destroy potential evidence every time a vehicle is repaired.  
Insurance companies frequently acquire title to an insured’s vehicle after the 
vehicle has been totaled in an accident, and will either re-sell the vehicle with 
a salvage title or have the vehicle parted-out.  This is appropriate and allowed 
by the insurance policy.85
A. THE PROBLEMATIC ISSUES IN IMPOSING A DUTY TO PRESERVE 
EVIDENCE ON A THIRD-PARTY INSURANCE COMPANY
To date, the general rule is that a third-party insurance company does 
not owe a general duty to preserve evidence, and therefore cannot be held 
liable to the insured for negligence as a matter of law.86 Courts that have 
———————————————————————————–
84 Michael D. Starks, Spoliation or Destruction of Evidence and the “Duty to 
Cooperate” with Third Party Claims, 10 Fla. Prac., Worker’s Comp. with Forms § 
22c:6 (2014 ed.).
85 See, e.g., Johnson v. United Servs.’ Auto. Ass’n., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 234 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
86 See, e.g., Wilson v. Beloit Corp., 921 F.2d 765, 767 (8th Cir. 1990) 
(finding that no duty exists in the absence of a special relationship); Koplin v. 
Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 734 P.2d 1177, 1179 (Kan. 1987) (stating that no 
duty for a third party to preserve evidence exists “[a]bsent some special 
relationship or duty arising by reason of an agreement, contract, statute, or 
other special circumstances.”) Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560 (W. Va. 
2003); But see Smith v. Atkinson, 771 So. 2d 429, 433 (Ala. 2000) (With a 
few exceptions, there is no general duty to preserve evidence) (“[R]ecogniz[ing] 
the doctrine that one who volunteers to act, though under no duty to do so, is 
thereafter charged with the duty of acting with due care and is liable for 
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held insurance companies to a duty to preserve evidence have differed in 
choosing when to attach the duty element leading to a divergence of 
numerous combinations of circumstances within the reported cases.  The 
courts are split on the test they apply; however, in some jurisdictions a duty 
to preserve evidence may arise in relation to a third-party spoliator where: 
(1) the spoliator voluntarily undertakes to preserve the evidence and a person 
reasonably relies on that undertaking to his detriment; (2) the spoliator 
entered into an agreement to preserve the evidence; (3) there has been a 
specific request to the spoliator to preserve the evidence; or (4) there is a 
duty to do so based upon a contract, statute, regulation, or some other special 
circumstance/relationship.87 Each element will be considered in turn.
1. The Spoliator Voluntarily Undertakes to Preserve the 
Evidence and Detrimental Reliance
Alabama has recognized that a duty to preserve evidence may arise 
when “one who volunteers to act, though under no duty to do so, is thereafter 
charged with the duty of acting with due care and is liable for negligence in 
connection therewith.”88 This principle “applies to insurance companies and 
their agents.”89 With a voluntary assumption of a duty, a third party has 
knowledge of potential or pending litigation and accepts responsibility for 
evidence to be used in that litigation and thus could be found liable for 
damages for the loss or destruction of the evidence.90
———————————————————————————–
negligence in connection therewith.”); id. at 433 n.3 (stating “[t]his Court 
has held that this principle applies to insurance companies and their agents.”) 
(citation omitted).
87 See Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11, 20 (Mont. 1999); See 
also Smith, 771 So. 2d at 433 (“[L]imiting the usual duty in third-party 
negligent spoliation to an agreement to preserve, or a voluntary undertaking 
with reasonable and detrimental reliance, or a specific request, ensures that 
such a spoliator has acted wrongfully in a specifically identified way.”).
88 Smith, 771 So.2d at 433 (quoting Dailey v. City of Birmingham, 378
So. 2d 728, 729 (Ala. 1979)). See, e.g., Beasley v. MacDonald Eng’g Co., 
249 So. 2d 844, 846-47 (Ala. 1971); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Jones, 356 
So. 2d 596, 598 (Ala. 1977); Dailey, 378 So. 2d at 729.
89 Smith, 771 So. 2d at 433 n.3 (citation omitted).
90 Id. at 433.
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2. Specific Request to the Spoliator to Preserve the 
Evidence
An appellate court in California held as a matter of law, “in the 
absence of a specific request by either the insureds or plaintiffs, defendants 
had no duty to preserve [a] vehicle part.”91 Alabama has recognized an 
additional condition to a specific request in that “[t]he specific request to 
preserve must be accompanied by an offer to pay the cost or otherwise bear 
the burden of preserving.  We do not think a tort duty to preserve should be 
created simply by someone specifically requesting a third party to preserve 
something.”92
3. Duty Based Upon an Agreement, a Contract, Statute, 
Regulation, or Some Other Special 
Circumstance/Relationship
a) The Spoliator Entered Into an Agreement or 
Contract
In a Massachusetts case, the Court stated “[a] third-party witness 
may also agree to preserve an item of evidence and thereby enter into an 
enforceable contract.”93 A California court determined that when an 
———————————————————————————–
91 Reid v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 218 Cal. Rptr. 913, 927 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1985). See also Dunham v. Condor Ins. Co., 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 747, 
749 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (“[I]n the absence of a specific request by either 
the insureds or plaintiffs, defendants had no duty to preserve the vehicle 
part.”).
92 See Smith, 771 So. 2d at 433; see also Johnson v. United Serv. 
Auto. Ass’n, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 234, 239 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998), abrogated 
by Lueter v. California, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 68 (Ct. App. 2002). But 
see Oliver, 993 P.2d at 20 (“We see no need to require the requesting party 
to include an offer to pay reasonable costs of preservation in the request. 
… [P]articularly where the evidence is small in size and manageable, there 
will be no costs associated with the preservation.”). The Oliver court 
contended that the third party may demand the costs but ultimately it will be 
left to the requesting party to decide if he or she wants to incur those 
costs. Id.
93 See Fletcher v. Dorchester Mut. Ins., 773 N.E.2d 420, 425 
(Mass. 2002) (recognizing a duty to preserve evidence by reason 
of agreement, contract, statute, or other special circumstance) (“Remedies for 
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insurance company made a promise to preserve the evidence, a duty was 
imposed on that insurance company.94 The insurance company’s promise 
may create a contract to preserve.  While there may be no tort duty to 
preserve evidence, that situation “does not preclude the existence of a duty 
based on contract.”95 In general, “an action in contract differs from an action 
in tort in that the former is based on the breach of a duty imposed by 
agreement while a tort action is based on the breach of a duty imposed by 
law.”96 Another court has held that where a party anticipates litigation, a 
contract can be created with a duty to preserve evidence whereby contractual 
remedies will be available with a breach.97 In a Florida case, the court 
determined it would not create a contractual duty absent an explicit 
agreement providing that such a duty exists.98
———————————————————————————–
breach of such an agreement are found in contract law, not in tort law. … 
[W]here the source of a nonparty's duty to preserve evidence is one that already 
states a cause of action and provides its own remedies, we will not invent a 
separate, duplicate cause of action in tort.”).
94 See Cooper v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870, 882 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (“[T]he duty to preserve evidence was independently 
assumed by State Farm when it made the promise to preserve the tire and 
plaintiff relied thereon.”). Cf. Lueter, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 1288-89
(determining there was no tort duty for defendant to preserve evidence 
because there was no promise to preserve the evidence upon which the 
plaintiff relied nor any independent statutory duty to preserve the evidence).
95 Coprich v. Super. Ct., 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 884, 891 (Cal. Ct. App 2000).
96 Miller v. Allstate, 573 So. 2d 24, 27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (citation 
omitted). See also Lueter, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 79 n.3 (stating in cases addressing 
the question of a cause of action in torts a statute must impose a remedy but a 
cause of action in contract is not foreclosed) (“The decisional authorities do not 
foreclose an action in contract where the defendant is under a contractual 
obligation to preserve evidence.”) (citation omitted). Cf. Coprich, 95 
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 891 (“While the existence of a tort duty in certain circumstances 
depends on policy considerations, those policy considerations do not negate the 
existence of a contractual obligation created by mutual agreement or promissory 
estoppel.”) (citations omitted).
97 Reynolds v. Bordelon, 172 So. 3d 589, 600 (La. 2015).
98 See, e.g., Silhan v. Allstate Ins., 236 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 
1310 n.10 (N.D. Fla. 2002) (distinguishing Miller, 573 So. 2d 24, where 
there was an explicit agreement, whereas in Silhan there was not an explicit 
agreement between parties) (“Allstate had a contractual duty to preserve the 
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b) Statute/Regulation
The United States District Court for Florida found that there must be 
“a legal duty for the insurance company to conduct a reasonable 
investigation, [and/or] a duty to preserve potential evidence.”99 In addition, 
a frequency of actions to indicate a general business practice, may give rise 
to a statutory violation.100 Another California court determined that “a duty 
———————————————————————————–
vehicle as evidence that was essential to Miller's anticipated civil 
litigation.”). Cf. Timber Tech Engineered Bldg. Prods. v. The Home Ins., 55 
P.3d 952, 954-55 (Nev. 2002) (declining to recognize an independent tort for 
first or third party spoliation of evidence but recognizing the preservation of 
evidence agreement created contractual rights and obligations between the 
parties but the court declined to reach the merits because the plaintiff failed 
to plead a breach of contract claim or raise the issue). See also Coprich, 95 
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 891 (“A contractual remedy may give rise to some of the 
same burdens and costs as would a spoliation tort remedy, but we cannot 
negate a contractual obligation based on policy considerations other than 
specific grounds such as illegality and unconscionability.”).
99 Silhan, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 1311 (N.D. Fla. 2002) (noting the statute in 
this particular case did not “explicitly say this”) ("Instead, 
the statutes allow an insured to maintain a civil action against the insured's 
insurance company for denying claims without conducting a reasonable 
investigation.”). See also Lueter, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 79:
[T]he tort of negligent spoliation of evidence cannot be recognized 
against a private party [and it] follows that any liability for spoliation 
against a public entity and its employees must be created statutorily 
rather than judicially. In order to find a statutorily based cause of 
action for negligent spoliation, it is not enough to find that the public 
entity had a legal duty with respect to property. Even though a 
person may have a duty to preserve evidence, countervailing 
considerations dictate against an expansive, speculative tort of 
spoliation.
Id.
100 Silhan, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 1311 (citing FLA. STAT. §
626.9541(1)(i) ("Unfair claim settlement practices. 3. [c]ommitting or 
performing with such frequency as to indicate a general business 
practice any of the following: (a) [f]ailing to adopt and implement standards 
for the proper investigation of claims; (b) [m]isrepresenting pertinent facts 
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to preserve evidence should be addressed through other means, such as 
effective sanctions devised by the Legislature or by regulatory bodies [and] 
it follows that in order to establish a tort for spoliation of evidence, a statute 
must expressly impose a spoliation remedy.”101
c) Special Circumstance/Relationship
Under common law, there is generally no duty for a third party to 
preserve evidence.102 However, a special relationship may give rise to a duty 
to preserve evidence.103 A Florida appellate court has reiterated there is no 
general duty to preserve in a third-party situation absent the above stated 
factors.  The Court noted that when a plaintiff establishes the existence of a 
special relationship between the parties, a duty to preserve the evidence is 
———————————————————————————–
or insurance policy provisions relating to coverages at issue; (c) [f]ailing to 
acknowledge and act promptly upon communications with respect to 
claims; (d) [d]enying claims without conducting reasonable investigations 
based upon available information.").
101 Lueter, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 79. Cf. Cooper, 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 882-
83 (providing general principles of tort law when considering a tort remedy 
for spoliation of evidence) (“A tort, whether intentional or negligent, 
involves a violation of a legal duty, imposed by statute, contract or 
otherwise, owed by the defendant to the person injured.”). Cf. Temple Cmty.
Hosp. v. Super. Ct., 976 P.2d 223, 232 (Cal. 1999) (“We observe that to the 
extent a duty to preserve evidence is imposed by statute or regulation upon 
the third party, the Legislature or the regulatory body that has imposed this 
duty generally will possess the authority to devise an effective sanction for 
violations of that duty.”).
102 See supra note 53.
103 See, e.g., Wilson v. Beloit Corp., 921 F.2d 765, 767 (8th Cir. 1990) 
(explaining that in the absence of a special relationship, the general rule is 
that one party does not need to preserve possible evidence for 
another party's future lawsuit against a third party); Edwards v. Louisville 
Ladder Co., 796 F. Supp. 966, 969 (W.D. La. 1992) (explaining that unless 
a special relationship exists between the parties, there is no duty to preserve 
possible evidence for future litigation). See generally Reid v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 218 Cal. Rptr. 913, 922-25 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1985) (discussing the development of the special relationship 
doctrine); Harpole v. Arkansas Dep’t of Human Serv., 820 F.2d 923, 926 
(8th Cir. 1987) (describing the special relationship doctrine's evolution).
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established.104 A special relationship exists by a “special circumstance” 
where parties have knowledge that evidence is relevant to future litigation.105
Additionally, a special circumstance may arise where a defendant possesses 
the evidence, the plaintiff asks a defendant to preserve the evidence, and the 
defendant complies with this request.106
In Illinois, courts have applied a two-prong test to any of the 
foregoing factors107 in determining whether a duty to preserve evidence 
exists.108 Under the first prong, if a plaintiff shows a duty was established 
by any of the foregoing factors, the first prong is satisfied, then the plaintiff 
must show that the duty extends to the evidence at issue “if a reasonable 
person in the defendant’s position should have foreseen that the evidence 
———————————————————————————–
104 See Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 710 A.2d 846, 849 (D.C. 
1998) (defining the circumstances of a special relationship “[w]hen
negligence is the basis of the suit alleging an economic injury resulting from 
the destruction of evidence, a duty on behalf of the defendant arising from 
the relationship between the parties or some other special circumstance must 
exist in order for the cause of action to survive.”) (quoting
Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, 734 P.2d 1177, 1179 (Kan. 1987)). See 
also Cooper, 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 892 (finding State Farm “entered into a 
special relationship with its insured to preserve the [Continental] tires 
[and] violated its contractual and fiduciary obligations to plaintiff by losing, 
destroying, disposing of and/or failing to preserve the [Continental] tires 
[because] [p]laintiff reasonably relied to his detriment upon [State Farm's] 
voluntary undertaking to preserve the [Continental] tires.”).
105 Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 271 (Ill. 1995), as 
modified on denial of reh'g (June 22, 1995). In Boyd, the Court determining 
there was a special relationship when the employees of Travelers Insurance 
went to Plaintiff’s home telling Fannie that they needed the heater to 
investigate Boyd's workers’ compensation claim. The heater belonged to 
Boyd. The employees knew that the heater was evidence relevant to future 
litigation. Under these alleged circumstances, Travelers assumed a duty to 
preserve Boyd's property.
106 See Dardeen v. Kuehling, 821 N.E.2d 227, 232 (Ill. 2004).
107 A duty to preserve evidence may arise through voluntary assumption 
of a duty to preserve the evidence by affirmative conduct, an agreement, a 
contract, a statute or another special circumstance. 
108 Boyd, 652 N.E.2d at 270-71; Dardeen, 821 N.E.2d at 231; Jones v. 
O'Brien Tire & Battery Serv. Ctr., Inc., 871 N.E.2d 98, 105 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2007).
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was material to a potential civil action.”109 If both prongs are not satisfied, 
there is no duty to preserve the evidence at issue.110
d) Control and Rebuttable Presumption
In determining liability in a third-party spoliation case, the Alabama 
Supreme Court announced a three-part test (“Smith test”) where, in addition 
to proving a duty, a breach, proximate cause, and damage, the plaintiff must 
also show: “(1) that the defendant spoliator had actual knowledge of pending 
or potential litigation; (2) that a duty was imposed upon the defendant 
through a voluntary undertaking, an agreement, or a specific request; and (3) 
that the missing evidence was vital to the plaintiff’s pending or potential 
action.”111 The Alabama Supreme Court determined by “[l]imiting the usual 
duty in third-party negligent spoliation to an agreement to preserve, or a 
voluntary undertaking with reasonable and detrimental reliance, or a specific 
request, ensures that such a spoliator has acted wrongfully in a specifically 
identified way.”112
When a plaintiff establishes the third party had notice and 
knowledge of a potential or underlying action, meaning “the third party 
assumed control over the evidence, and that the lost or destroyed evidence 
was ‘vital’ to his claim in the underlying action or potential action, a 
rebuttable presumption arises in favor of the plaintiff.”113 Under the Smith
test, a rebuttable presumption arises once all three elements are satisfied for 
which the defendant must overcome or subsequently be liable for 
damages.114 The defendant may rebut this presumption by “producing 
evidence showing that the plaintiff would not have prevailed in the 
underlying action even if the lost or destroyed evidence had been 
available.”115
———————————————————————————–
109 Boyd, 652 N.E.2d at 271.
110 Id.
111 Smith v. Atkinson, 771 So. 2d 429, 432 (Ala. 2000).
112 Id. at 433.
113 Id. at 435. 
114Id. See also Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560, 573 (W. 
Va. 2003) (“[o]nce the [elements of the tort of intentional spoliation of evidence] 
are established, there arises a rebuttable presumption that but for the fact of the 
spoliation of evidence, the party injured by the spoliation would have prevailed 
in the pending or potential litigation.”).
115 Smith, 771 So.2d at 435.
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The duty element of the tort has proved particularly troublesome for 
courts and commentators.  Courts have increasingly been confronted with 
the same question in addressing the issue: what duty should be imposed on 
an alleged third-party spoliator who possesses or controls one of these totally 
or partially damaged vehicles? 
In total loss situations, insurance companies acquire possession of 
the motor vehicle retaining exclusive control over the motor vehicle.  In total 
loss situations, many vehicles are damaged beyond the extent of reasonable 
repair.  In total loss situations, an insurance company compensates the 
policyholder for what their coverage allows and subsequently sells the 
vehicle to automobile wholesalers or distributors for re-sale with branded 
titles or to salvage the remaining usable parts to assist in the loss recovery.  
This process helps ensure that insured customer’s policy premiums can 
remain low in the growing demands of our economy.  This orderly process 
of logging the true cost of losses (payout minus salvage recovery) in the year 
incurred would be greatly disrupted if third-party spoliation claims against 
insurance companies were liberally allowed.  It is impractical for insurance 
companies to store each potential item that might lead to litigation in the 
future.116 To do so would impose high costs on insurance companies to 
acquire storage space to preserve various evidence at least for as long as the 
applicable statute of limitations period for a multitude of possible causes of 
actions.117 Despite the statute of limitation periods, an additional element 
———————————————————————————–
116 See Dowdle Butane Gas Co., Inc. v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 1124, 1131 
(Miss. 2002) (quoting Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Super. Ct., 954 P.2d 511, 
519 (Cal. 1998) (discussing the implications on a third party if the court were 
to require it to “preserve for an indefinite period things of no . . . value solely 
to avoid the possibility of spoliation liability in future litigation.”)).
117 Only a few courts have addressed the issue of the applicable statute 
of limitations to spoliation of evidence claims providing for a two-year -
Gicking v. Joyce Intern., Inc., No. 93-00434, WL 942114 at *4 (Pa. Com. 
PL. Mar. 22, 1996) (two years from the date plaintiff should have recognized 
a cause of action); Vedder v. Zakib, 618 S.E.2d 537 (W. Va. 2005). Cf.
Wofford v. Tracy, 48 N.E.3d 1109, 1117-119 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015), appeal 
denied, 48 N.E.3d 678 (Ill. 2016) (disagreeing with Plaintiffs’ argument that 
the five-year limitations in the Code applies because a spoliation action 
arises from a destruction in property, not personal injuries. The Court 
disagreed concluding the two-year limitations period for personal injuries 
applied because the “Plaintiffs’ underlying negligence claims are the proper 
focus and, in those counts, plaintiffs seek recovery only for personal 
injuries.”); three-year - Daoust v. McWilliams, 716 A.2d 922, 925-
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within the spoliation tort should be applied before imposing liability on an 
insurance company: a notice requirement.
B. NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
Courts have considered various other factors in the determination of 
when it can be appropriate to place a duty to preserve evidence on a third
party involved in spoliation.118 In one case, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
held: 
[A] party or potential litigant with a legitimate reason to 
destroy evidence discharges its duty to preserve relevant 
evidence within its control by providing the opposing party 
or potential litigant:
(1) Reasonable notice of a possible claim; 
(2) The basis for that claim; 
———————————————————————————–
27 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998) (discussing application period for intentional 
spoliation), and five-year limitation period before a civil action claim is 
barred. Schusse v. Pace, 779 N.E.2d 259, 267 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (noting 
a five year statute of limitations beginning from the time the evidence is 
destroyed). In determining the accrual date for the statute of limitations, 
courts vary. After the plaintiff should have recognized a cause of action for 
spoliation, on the one hand (Gicking, WL 942114 at *4), and when a cause 
of action does not accrue until the underlying action in the third party context 
was completed or the other. See, e.g., Lincoln Ins. Co. v. Home Emergency 
Serv., Inc., 812 So.2d 433 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
118 In Pirocchi v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 365 F. Supp. 277 (East. 
Dist. Pa 1973), the plaintiff, a hotel employee, sustained injury when a chair 
in which he was sitting, collapsed. Liberty Mutual took possession of the 
chair so that it could conduct an investigation as to whether there were 
possible manufacturing defects in the chair. When the chair was returned to 
the hotel, it disappeared, precluding the plaintiff from pursuing the 
manufacturing tortfeasor. The plaintiff then brought a lawsuit against 
Liberty Mutual for failing to tag or mark the chair properly, failing to obtain 
a receipt following its delivery back to the hotel, and by failing to place the 
chair with the proper supervisor. Id. at 279. The Court denied Liberty
Mutual’s motion for summary judgment concluding that factual issues 
existed regarding Liberty Mutual’s duty with respect to the chair. Id. at 282.
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(3) The existence of evidence relevant to the claim; and 
(4) Reasonable opportunity to inspect that evidence.119
Unfortunately, no uniform pattern of decisions has emerged from 
these cases.  In addressing the first element in the Smith test, one focus is 
upon whether the third party possessed actual notice of the pending litigation 
or the potential for litigation.120 In determining what is sufficient notice, 
“[t]he textbook definitions of ‘actual’ and ‘constructive’ knowledge and 
notice are helpful guides in assessing the state of a third party’s knowledge 
and notice of pending or potential litigation.”121
1. Actual Notice
Generally, when a lawsuit is served, a party has actual knowledge 
that litigation has begun and, thereby, may be obligated to preserve all 
discoverable evidence.122 Therefore, the duty to preserve evidence from 
spoliation can affect third parties who may be required to retain evidence in 
the event they are given proper notice of possible litigation.123 Absent notice 
———————————————————————————–
119 Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Golke, 768 N.W.2d 729, 737 (Wis. 
2009).
120 Smith, 771 So. 2d at 433 (“When a third party has knowledge of a 
pending or potential lawsuit and accepts responsibility for evidence that 
would be used in that lawsuit, it should be held liable for damage resulting 
from the loss or destruction of that evidence.”); County of
Solano v. Delancy, 264 Cal. Rptr. 721, 729 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Mace v. 
Ford Motor Co., 653 S.E.2d 660, 665 (W. Va. 2007) (providing that actual 
knowledge is a “direct and explicit notice” of a potential lawsuit).
121 Mace, 653 S.E.2d at 666.
122 See Valentine v. Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp., No. 98 Civ. 1815,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15378, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1999); Turner v. 
Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). See 
also Scott v. IBM Corp., 196 F.R.D. 233, 249 (D.N.J. Nov. 29, 
2000) (“While a litigant is under no duty keep or retain every document in 
its possession, even in advance of litigation it is under a duty to preserve 
what it knows, or reasonably should know, will likely be requested in 
reasonably foreseeable litigation.”).
123 See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 169 
F.R.D. 598 (D.N.J. 1997), rev’d on other grounds, 133 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 
1998) (insurer was sanctioned where company’s top management 
recognized the company’s obligation to preserve documents that were 
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of litigation, an insurance company and others generally possess the right to 
dispose of ones’ own property without facing liability.124 However, some 
———————————————————————————–
related with particular lawsuits but failed to actively formulate or implement 
a document retention policy). See also Willard v. Caterpillar, Inc., 48 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 607, 625-26 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that some courts 
impose discovery sanctions only if a party is on notice that documents are 
potentially relevant); Baliotis v. McNeil, 870 F. Supp. 1285, 1290 (M.D.Pa. 
1994) (quoting Fire Ins. Exch. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 747 P.2d 911, 914 
(Nev. 1987)) (“[L]itigant is under a duty to preserve evidence which it 
knows or reasonably should know is relevant to the action.”). Cf. Killings v. 
Enter. Leasing Co., 9 So. 3d 1216, 1223 (Ala. 2008) (finding leasing 
company was given notice that process could take several years when it 
assumed duty to preserve evidence) (“[I]t is ultimately of no import that 
approximately two and a half years passed between the date of the accident 
and the date the [evidence] was sold.”).
124 See, e.g., Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415, 
419 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 
216 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“[I]t goes without saying that a party can only be 
sanctioned for destroying evidence if it had a duty to preserve it.”); Coleman 
v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 185, 191 (N.M. 1995) (“[A] property owner 
has no duty to preserve or safeguard his or her property for the benefit of 
other individuals in a potential lawsuit” without the existence of a duty to 
preserve evidence). See also Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., 836 
F.2d 1104, 1112 (8th Cir. 1988); Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Liebert Corp., No. 
96 CIV. 6675 (DC), 1998 WL 363834 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 1998); Smith v. 
Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 832-33 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). See Reid v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 218 Cal. Rptr. 913, 927 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1985) (holding that without specific request, insurance company has no duty to 
preserve evidence); Mace, 653 S.E.2d at 666 (“[I]n order for a plaintiff to 
successfully pursue a claim against a third party for negligent spoliation of 
evidence, the plaintiff must show that the third party had actual knowledge, 
from whatever source, of the plaintiff's pending or potential 
lawsuit.”). Cf. American Family, 768 N.W.2d at 737 (“[A] party or potential 
litigant with a legitimate reason to destroy evidence discharges its duty to 
preserve relevant evidence within its control by providing the opposing party 
or potential litigant: (1) reasonable notice of a possible claim; (2) the basis 
for that claim; (3) the existence of evidence relevant to the claim; and (4) 
reasonable opportunity to inspect that evidence.”).
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courts have found a third party liable without notice.125 Another factor in 
determining whether a duty exists in the absence of actual notice is 
foreseeability of harm caused to the plaintiff as a result of the spoliation.126
A duty can arise if it’s reasonably foreseeable that a lawsuit will ensue and 
evidence will be discoverable in connection with that lawsuit.127
For example, in Reid v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co.,128 the notice and foreseeability factors were discussed at great length in 
the context of a third-party spoliator.129 In Reid, the plaintiff was injured in 
———————————————————————————–
125 See, e.g., Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 1998 WL 363834, at *3. See 
also Lewy, 836 F.2d at 1112 (discussing that actual notice is not required to 
impose a duty to preserve evidence) ("[I]f the corporation knew or should 
have known that the [it] would be material at some point in the future then 
such documents should have been preserved.”).
126 County of Solano v. Delancy, 264 Cal. Rptr. 721, 729 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1989). See Velasco v. Commercial Bldg. Maint. Co., 215 Cal. Rptr. 504 
(Cal. Ct. 1995) (where a janitor disposed of a piece of evidence in a paper 
bag, the Court found that there was no foreseeability of potential harm 
caused by discarding the evidence). See also Mathias v. Jacobs, 197 F.R.D. 
29, 37 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“[D]uty to preserve arises when a party . . 
. anticipates litigation.”).
127 Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir. 
2001); Kalumetals, Inc. v. Hitachi Magnetics Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 510, 520 
(W.D. Pa. 1998); Howell v. Maytag, 168 F.R.D. 502, 505 (M.D. Pa. 1996); 
Shaffer v. RWP Group, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 19, 24 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Moyers v. 
Ford Motor Co., 941 F. Supp. 883, 884 (E.D. Mo. 1996). See Baliotis, 870 
F. Supp. at 1290 (providing where the courts have imposed sanctions for 
conduct that has arisen before the litigation when the spoliator either knew 
or should have known about the potential or imminent litigation); WM. T. 
Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1443, 1445 (D.C. Cal. 
1984); id. at 372 (quoting Dillon v. Nissan Motor Co. Ltd., 986 F.2d 263, 
267 (C.A. 8th Cir. 1993)); Am. Family Ins. v. Vill. Pontiac GMC, Inc., 585 
N.E.2d 1115, 1118 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Applegate v. Seaborn, 477 N.E.2d 
74, 76 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (Webber, J. dissenting). See also Thompson ex
rel. Thompson v. Owensby, 704 N.E.2d 134, 137 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) 
(“[T]he relationship between the carrier and a third party claimant could 
warrant recognition of a duty if the carrier knew or should have known of 
the likelihood of litigation and of the claimant's need for the evidence in the 
litigation.”).
128 Reid, 218 Cal. Rptr. 913 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
129 Id.
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a vehicle accident that damaged his car.  Subsequently the insurance 
company settled the property damage claim, and it sold the car to an auto 
body company causing the plaintiff to be unable to bring a products liability 
suit against the manufacturer.130 Nineteen months after the accident, the 
plaintiff learned of the car’s destruction and sued the insurer.131 Applying 
the special relationship doctrine132, the Court of Appeals emphasized that the 
foreseeability requirement was necessary to establish a special relationship 
and impose a duty on the insurer.133 The insurance company “had no actual 
knowledge of any unreasonable risk of harm to [the plaintiff] by disposing 
of the totaled [car] in the ordinary course of processing the claims ....”134
When “[the insurance company] sold the wreckage of the car, it simply did 
not know of any potential claims by or risk of harm to [the plaintiff].”135 The 
Court concluded that no such duty had been shown because the insurance 
company lacked actual knowledge of the potential claims and as a result 
could not foresee that selling the car could interfere with plaintiff’s interest 
in a prospective lawsuit.136 Therefore, the Court held “as a matter of law 
that, in the absence of a specific request by either [the insured] or [plaintiff], 
[the insurer] had no duty to preserve the . . . vehicle.”137 However, even 
———————————————————————————–
130 Id. at 917-18.
131 Id.
132 A special relationship may give rise to a duty to preserve evidence,
see sources cited supra note 103.
133 Reid, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 923.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 922.
137 In Reid, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 927, it is established that a defendant 
charged with negligent spoliation has no duty to preserve evidence for the 
plaintiff's use against a third party absent a “specific request” from the 
plaintiff to do so. The few published California decisions analyzing the tort 
of spoliation have held that “[b]oth negligent and intentional spoliation 
require the loss or destruction of physical evidence that a defendant 
had promised to preserve”. Anderson v. Rinaldo, No. C93–2213 WHO, 
1994 WL 46728, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 1994). See Dunham v. Condor Ins. 
Co., 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 747, 749 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997), where a plaintiff cannot 
establish detrimental reliance without first requesting preservation of the 
evidence (quoting Reid, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 927). See also Murphy v. Target 
Prods., 580 N.E.2d 687, 688-89 (Ind. App. 1991) (holding that an employer 
owes an employee no duty to preserve possible evidence for the employee 
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where the third party spoliator has both notice of the pending lawsuit and 
foreseeability, courts may still find that a duty to preserve evidence has 
ended under the specific facts of the case.138
2. Constructive Notice
Some courts have employed a constructive notice approach in 
imposing a duty on a defendant to preserve evidence.139 Following the 
constructive notice theory, these courts find an obligation to preserve 
evidence is imposed once the plaintiff threatens the defendant with filing a 
———————————————————————————–
which may be used by employee in some future legal action against a third 
party absent an agreement between the parties, a contract between the 
parties, a special relationship between the parties, or a statute). See 
also Dunham, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 750 (concluding absence of a specific 
request the defendants had no duty to take any steps to preserve the vehicle 
part and “there cannot be liability for spoliation where the defendant never 
had possession or control over the evidence and was not the one who 
destroyed it.”).
138 See Murray v. Farmers Ins. Co., 796 P.2d 101, 103 (Idaho 1990) 
(duty to preserve the evidence ended when one year had passed since the 
promise to preserve the evidence had been made to the plaintiff’s attorney, 
and plaintiff’s attorney did not respond to the salvage yard’s notification that 
the evidence would be destroyed unless it received a request for an 
extension.). See id., where the plaintiff was involved in a single vehicle 
accident when a new Chrysler failed to negotiate a curve. The insurance 
company had the car towed to a salvage yard, but postponed salvaging it, 
because the plaintiff’s attorney requested time to have the car examined by 
an expert. Id. The insurer notified the plaintiff’s attorney, after a year’s delay 
“that the car would be salvaged unless the attorney indicated that the wanted 
the vehicle preserved for an additional period of time.” Id. After receiving 
no response, the insurer ordered the car destroyed. Id. The Idaho Supreme 
Court found that the insurer’s notification to the insured, prior to destruction 
of the car shielded it from exposure to tort liability. Id. See also County of Solano 
v. Delancy, 264 Cal. Rptr. 721 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); and Reid, 218 Cal. Rptr. 
913 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
139 See, e.g., Johnson v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 234, 
240 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (addressing spoliation by a third 
party); See also Nolte, supra note 17, at 380-81; Joe Wetzel, Spoiling an
Illinois Personal Injury Plaintiff’s Spoliation Claim for Routinely 
Maintained Items, 28 S. ILL. U. L.J. 455, 464 (2004).
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lawsuit relating to the evidence or in the event of a plaintiff filing a 
complaint.140 One proponent of the constructive knowledge requirement 
argues, “the constructive knowledge standard of conduct presents the most 
efficient allocation of transaction costs.”141 However, this approach has 
often been criticized as too broad in scope because it requires “property 
owners to make often-arbitrary determinations about what is relevant to a 
hypothetical lawsuit that has not, and may never be, filed.”142 Some courts 
have agreed with this contention.143
———————————————————————————–
140 Wetzel, supra note 138, at 465.
141 Nolte, supra note 17, at 384 (“The insurer and the policyholder 
share the transaction costs involved in insurance-related spoliation 
cases. Resolution of the knowledge requirement problem should depend on 
the most efficient allocation of these costs”) (quoting Robert Cooter & 
Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 477 (1988)):
"Prior to the conclusion of the insurance case, the insurance carrier 
bears no transaction costs except those created by its duty to 
investigate and appropriately consider the insurance case to the 
degree necessary to foresee its insured’s prospective third-party 
litigation. The policyholder, on the other hand, bears additional 
transaction costs for acquiring information from the insurer. If 
courts applied the constructive knowledge standard, the insurer 
would incur no additional transaction cost since the duty 
to foresee possible third-party action already exists. On the other 
hand, the policyholder would expend additional transaction costs if 
required to inform the insurer of prospective litigation."
Id.
142 See Judge, supra note 17, at 452; County of Solano, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 
731 (Anderson, P. J. dissenting) (stating “on a clear day you can foresee 
forever!”).
143 Johnson, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 240; See also Hannah v. Heeter, 584 
S.E.2d 560, 570 (W. Va. 2003) (providing a third party must have actual 
notice of a pending or potential litigation and asserting “[A] third party's 
constructive notice of a pending or potential action is not sufficient to force 
upon the third party the duty to preserve evidence.”) (quoting Smith v. 
Atkinson, 771 So.2d 429, 433 (Ala. 2000)); Mace v. Ford Motor Co., 653 
S.E.2d 660, 666 (W.Va. 2007) (appellants arguing the insurance carrier was 
“on notice” because they had paid “500 claims” and filed their own product 
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3. Method of Notice   
A subset of the notice requirement is the method of delivering that 
notice.  In American Family Mutual Insurance Company v. Golke,144 the 
Court provided that “notice can be effectuated by first-class mail, and 
evidence of mailing creates a presumption of receipt that may create an issue 
for the fact finder only by denial of receipt.”145 However, Chief Justice 
Abrahamson, in her concurrence stated, “[i]n some circumstances first-class 
mail might be fine [and] in others, not.”146 She further noted that in a 
“technologically-advanced 21st century”147 it is more efficient to use a 
method of notice “that provides written evidence that he or she actually did 
give the notice and that the recipient actually did receive the notice.”148
However, the majority in Golke determined that the method or 
frequency of notice is less important because ultimately it is left to the court’s 
judgment and discretion, under the totality of the circumstances to determine 
whether the content of the notice was sufficient.149 The Court noted that 
certain factors will be taken into consideration in determining the sufficiency 
of notice:
———————————————————————————–
liability suit against Ford however the court stated, that with constructive 
notice, where there may or might be a cause of action, is insufficient to give 
rise to a third-party's duty to preserve evidence; there has to be a direct and 
explicit notice).
144 Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Golke, 768 N.W.2d 729, 731 (Wisc. 
2009).
145 Id. at 738 (The majority noting that “[t]he legislature has long 
recognized that first-class mail service is an efficient mechanism that is 
reasonably calculated to provide actual notice of possible or pending 
litigation and effective alteration of substantive legal rights and 
interests.”). See also Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11, 20 (Mont. 
1999) (providing that a telefax of a request to preserve the evidence 
was a "usual and customary procedure” in delivering important letters and 
concluding that through a telefax and telephone conference “a jury may very 
well determine that Stimson had actual notice of the Olivers’ request to 
preserve the evidence.”).
146 American Family, 768 N.W.2d at 748 (Abrahamson, C.J., 
concurring).
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 737-38.
2017                   RESOLVING THIRD-PARTY INSURANCE
                    COMPANY AUTOMOBILE SPOLIATION CLAIMS  
 
105
(1) The length of time the evidence can be preserved;
(2) The ownership of the evidence;
(3) The prejudice posed to possible adversaries by the 
destruction of the evidence;
(4) The form of the notice;
(5) The sophistication of the parties; and
(6) The ability of the party in possession of the evidence to bear 
the burden and expense of preserving it.150
In considering the sixth factor, the issue of cost arises when one party has 
the responsibility to bear the burden of expense in preserving the evidence.  
The Supreme Court of Alabama pronounced a specific request to preserve 
the evidence “must be accompanied by an offer to pay the cost or otherwise 
bear the burden of preserving [because the court did not consider] a tort duty 
to preserve should be created simply by someone specifically requesting a 
third party to preserve something.”151 Numerous cases have noted the high 
costs to insurance companies to locate and obtain the storage space needed 
to preserve evidence.152 One court has provided that it was “sensitive to the 
legitimate interests and rights of third parties who are in the possession of 
such evidence.”153 Because preservation may involve significant burdens, 
the request to preserve evidence must be accompanied by an offer to pay the 
cost of that preservation and also, the third party “can decline the 
responsibility, shifting the risk of loss back to the plaintiff.”154
Alternatively, the Supreme Court of Montana found there is “no 
need to require the requesting party to include an offer to pay reasonable 
costs of preservation in the request [because] particularly where the evidence 
is small in size and manageable, there will be no costs associated with the 
preservation.”155 The Court further stated that the burden of preservation 
———————————————————————————–
150 Id.
151 Smith v. Atkinson, 771 So. 2d 429, 433 (Ala. 2000).
152 See, e.g., Dowdle Butane Gas Co. v. Moore, 831 So.2d 1124, 1131 
(Miss. 2002); Gicking v. Joyce Int’l Inc., No. 93-00434 WL 942114 (Mar. 
22, 1996) at *4; State ex. rel Vedder v. Zakib, 618 S.E.2d 537 
(W. Va. 2005); Schusse v. Pace Suburban Bus Div. of Reg’l Trans. 
Auth., 779 N.E.2d 259 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
153 Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11, 18 (Mont. 1999).
154 Smith, 771 So.2d at 433.
155 Oliver, 993 P.2d at 20.
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should be on the person or entity requesting the preservation, and a third 
party can demand “reasonable costs” from the requesting party.156
C. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
1. Justifications
Although the courts have shown inconsistency in recognizing a 
cause of action for third party spoliation cases, some courts have announced 
compelling policy considerations for imposing a duty to preserve in third-
party spoliation situations.  For example, the Montana Supreme Court 
provided: 
Relevant evidence is critical to the search for the truth. The 
intentional or negligent destruction or spoliation of evidence cannot 
be condoned and threatens the very integrity of our judicial system. 
There can be no truth, fairness, or justice in a civil action where 
relevant evidence has been destroyed before trial. Historically, our 
judicial system has fostered methods and safeguards to insure that 
relevant evidence is preserved. Ultimately, the responsibility rests 
with both the trial and appellate courts to insure that the parties to 
the litigation have a fair opportunity to present their claims or 
defenses.157
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals determined despite the 
speculative nature of damages in spoliation of evidence cases, recovery 
should not be barred altogether and concluded “[w]here the tort itself is of 
such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment of the amount of damages with 
certainty, it would be a perversion of fundamental principles of justice to 
———————————————————————————–
156 Id. (stating “the person requesting preservation would have the option 
of deciding whether or not to incur such costs.”). But see Thompson 
v. Owensby, 704 N.E.2d 134, 139 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (providing, with 
respect for insurance companies, “the evidence must be maintained by 
someone, and a liability carrier can typically maintain evidence at a lower 
cost than an individual claimant because the carrier can distribute the cost 
among all policyholders.”). But cf. Killings v. Enter. Leasing Co., 9 So. 3d
1216, 1222-23 n.6 (Ala. 2008) (noting that a duty to preserve evidence can 
be established without the plaintiff offering to pay the cost or bear the burden 
of preservation if the defendant voluntarily agrees to preserve the evidence).
157 Oliver, 993 P.2d at 17.
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deny all relief to the injured person, and thereby relieve the wrongdoer from 
making any amend for his act.”158
2. Pitfalls
Most recently, the case of Reynolds v. Bordelon159 specifically 
addressed the issues in imposing a duty on an insurance company.  In 
Reynolds, the issue was whether Louisiana recognized a claim for negligent 
spoliation.160 In this case, a motorist was involved in a vehicle accident and 
subsequently brought an action against the manufacture of the vehicle’s air 
bags for failure to properly deploy during the accident.161 However, 
plaintiff’s insurer Automobile Club Inter-Insurance Exchange (“ACIIE”) 
and the custodian of his vehicle after the accident, Insurance Auto Auctions 
Corporations (“IAA”), failed to preserve the vehicle for inspection purposes.
Because of this, the parties could not determine whether any defects existed 
despite being put on notice of the need for preservation.  Plaintiff brought a 
claim against the custodian of his vehicle and the insurer for negligent 
spoliation of evidence.  The Court emphasized that the duty inquiry was 
central to its discussion on whether Louisiana recognized the tort of 
negligent spoliation of evidence.  The Court then analyzed the duty 
requirement in terms of policy considerations.162
The Court in Reynolds focused on several policy considerations in 
rejecting the tort of negligent spoliation of evidence.163 The Court 
specifically discussed: (1) that the recognition of the tort would not act to 
deter future conduct;164 (2) the compensation to victims was highly 
———————————————————————————–
158 Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 710 A.2d 846, 853 (D.C. 
1998) (quoting Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 
U.S. 555, 563 (1931)).
159 Reynolds v. Bordelon, 172 So. 3d 589 (La. 2015).
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id. (quoting Frank L. Maraist & Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Louisiana 
Tort Law § 5.02 (2004)).
163 Id. at 596.
164 According to the Reynolds Court, “. . . the act of negligently 
spoliating evidence is so unintentional an act that any recognition of the 
tort by the courts would not act to deter future conduct, but would, rather, 
act to penalize a party who was not aware of its potential wrongdoing in 
the first place.” Reynolds, 172 So. 3d 589, 597 (2015). Emphasizing that 
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speculative;165 (3) flaws existed within the satisfaction of the community’s 
sense of justice and predictability;166 and, (4) the recognition of the tort 
would result in improper allocation of resources.167 The Court in Reynolds
found that societal justice and predictability weighed heavily against the 
recognition of the tort of negligent spoliation of evidence.168 Adoption of 
the tort would place the imposition of a new duty on third parties to protect 
them from liability, “resulting in higher costs for the public” outweighing 
societal interest as a whole.169 Observing that if it were to recognize the tort 
of negligent spoliation, third parties would be left with the burden of 
adopting retention policies in fear of possible liability in the unknown future, 
which inadvertently leads to possible implications of property rights.170
Many other jurisdictions have also demonstrated reluctance in imposing 
unreasonable burdens on insurance companies to preserve and maintain 
evidence171 finding that “the burdens and costs of recognizing a tort remedy 
for third party spoliation are considerable — perhaps even greater than in the 
———————————————————————————–
this is particularly true when the spoliation of evidence is by a third-party 
who has no motivation to do so. Id. See also Temple Cmty. Hosp. v. Super. 
Ct., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 852, 861 (“If existing remedies appear limited, that may 
well be because third party spoliation has not appeared to be a significant 
problem in our courts. After all, the nonparty who is not acting on behalf of 
a party but is independently motivated to destroy evidence with the intent to 
interfere in the outcome of litigation between other parties must be a rarity, 
perhaps because such destruction can subject the nonparty to criminal 
prosecution.”). But cf. Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 710 A.2d 846, 853 
(D.C. 1998).
165 “[T]he parties and the trier of fact would be called upon to estimate 
the impact of the missing evidence and guess at its ability to prove or 
disprove the underlying claim, resulting in liability based far too much on 
speculation.” Reynolds, 172 So.3d at 598. The Court also reasoned that as a 
comparative negligence jurisdiction, liability would be highly speculative in 
determining the measure of the proportional fault of the spoliator and the 
likelihood of success of the underlying case. Id. at 597-98.
166 Id. at 598.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 See, e.g., Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d
511, 521 (Cal. 1998) (weighing the benefits of recognizing the spoliation 
cause of action against the burdens and costs it would impose).
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case of first party spoliation.”172 Additionally, a vast expanse in the class of 
potential defendants and plaintiffs would result.173
———————————————————————————–
172 Temple Cmty. Hosp. v. Superior Court, 976 P.2d 223, 233 (Cal. 
1999). (“In sum, we conclude that the benefits of recognizing a tort cause of 
action, in order to deter third party spoliation of evidence and compensate 
victims of such misconduct, are outweighed by the burden to litigants, 
witnesses, and the judicial system that would be imposed by potentially 
endless litigation over a speculative loss, and by the cost to society of 
promoting onerous record and evidence retention policies”). See 
also Coprich v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 884, 890 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2000) (the policy considerations compelled the court to assert that “the 
burdens and costs to litigants, the judicial system, and others if the courts 
were to allow a tort remedy for negligent spoliation of evidence would 
outweigh the limited benefits [and] conclude there is no tort remedy for first 
party or third party negligent spoliation of evidence.”). But see Smith v. 
Atkinson, 771 So. 2d 429, 433 (Ala. 2000) (where the court disagreed with 
the insurer’s argument that a third party “duty to preserve evidence could 
result in wasteful and unnecessary record- and evidence-retention practices 
[and contended] if the third party does not wish to take responsibility for 
evidence, it can decline the responsibility, shifting the risk of loss back to the 
plaintiff.”).
173 As one court put it:
It is common knowledge that thousands of accidents occur on 
California roadways each year, leaving behind totally and partially 
damaged cars and trucks. Every accident involving personal injury 
or property damage has the potential to be a lawsuit. These lawsuits 
could encompass myriad parties, claims, and cross-claims—known 
and unknown, foreseeable and unforeseeable.
Johnson v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 234, 241 (Cal. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1998); See also Temple, 976 P.2d at 229-30:
Third party spoliation of evidence is analogous to perjury by a 
witness, and the same endless spiral of lawsuits over litigation-
related misconduct could ensue were we to recognize a tort cause of 
action for third party spoliation. As in the case of spoliation by a 
party, one party unfortunately may be deprived of critical evidence 
and of a defense, or remain uncompensated for an injury. This 
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D. DAMAGES AND PENALTIES/SANCTIONS
1. Damages
Calculating and estimating damages has shown to be one of the most 
difficult tasks for courts in third party spoliation of evidence cases.  One 
court determined damages should be established by a “trial court and the trier 
of fact after a full trial on the merits.”174 However, damages are speculative 
———————————————————————————–
potential injustice cannot be avoided, however, if we are to escape 
what we have identified as the greater harm of subjecting parties, 
witnesses, and the courts to unending litigation over the conduct and 
outcome of a lawsuit.
But see Id. at 237 (Kennard, J., dissenting):
[T]ort liability for third party spoliation does not pose a threat to the 
finality of adjudication . . . [a] third party spoliator by definition is 
not a party to the underlying cause of action to which 
the spoliated evidence is relevant, and the spoliator has not litigated 
with the spoliation victim any issue relating to that evidence or to 
the underlying cause of action [and] [a]ny judgment against the third 
party spoliator would not alter the previous determination of liability 
between the spoliation victim and the spoliation victim's opponent 
in the underlying action [thus] [a] tort remedy would therefore have 
no effect, either formally or practically, on the judgment rendered on 
the cause of action to which the spoliated evidence was relevant and 
would not clash with the public policy favoring finality of 
adjudication.
174 Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 272 (Ill. 1995), as 
modified on denial of reh'g (June 22, 1995). But see Lueter v. California, 
115 Cal. Rptr. 2d, 74-75 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.):
[W]ithout knowing the content and weight of the spoliated evidence, 
it would be impossible for the jury to meaningfully assess what role 
the missing evidence would have played in the determination of the 
underlying action . . . [thus] the jury could only speculate as to what 
the nature of the spoliated evidence was and what effect it might 
have had on the outcome of the underlying litigation.
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due to the uncertainty of what the destroyed evidence would have shown.175
Addressing this uncertainty, courts have come up with possible solutions to 
calculate uncertain damages including: (1) awarding the plaintiff the entire 
amount of damages that the plaintiff would have received if the original 
lawsuit had been pursued successfully;176 (2) awarding the plaintiff any costs 
and fees incurred in pursuit of the original suit177; and (3) discounting 
damages to account for uncertainties by balancing of interests by the 
damages that would have been obtained in the underlying lawsuit, multiplied 
by the probability that plaintiff would have won the suit had he possessed
the spoliated evidence.178
———————————————————————————–
Id.
175 See, e.g., Smith, 771 So. 2d at 436 (providing “the appropriate measure 
of damages is difficult to determine in spoliation cases because, without the 
missing evidence, the likelihood of the plaintiffs prevailing on the merits cannot 
be precisely determined. ‘It would seem to be sheer guesswork, even presuming 
that the destroyed evidence went against the spoliator, to calculate what it would 
have contributed to the plaintiffs success on the merits of the underlying 
lawsuit.’”) (quoting Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp., 501 N.E.2d 1312, 1320 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1987); See also Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper 
Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931) (contending speculative damages cannot be 
recovered because the amount is too uncertain and providing the general rule 
“that all damages resulting necessarily and immediately and directly from the 
breach are recoverable, and not those that are contingent and uncertain.”). Cf. 
Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11, 21 (Mont. 1999) (providing “a 
plaintiff is required to prove damages with reasonable certainty . . . [but] when 
there is strong evidence of the fact of damage, a defendant should not escape 
liability because the amount of damage cannot be proven with precision.”).
176 Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 710 A.2d 846, 853 (D.C. 1998) (citing 
3 JEROME H. NATES, et al., DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 19.33.3 
(1997)).
177 Id.
178 Id. at 852-53 (choosing to adopt the third solution and holding “that 
in an action for negligent or reckless spoliation of evidence, damages arrived 
at through just and reasonable estimation based on relevant data should be 
multiplied by the probability that the plaintiff would have won the 
underlying suit had the spoliated evidence been available.”). See also Miller 
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 573 So. 2d 24, 27-28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
(providing the “harsh results of the application of the rule of certainty, 
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There are other courts that have applied the certainty requirement for 
damages more rigorously in contract cases compared to tort cases.179 One 
court provided the reason for this difference in application is that in tort 
“once the plaintiff is in the area of risk created by the defendant’s wrong, the 
defendant is usually liable for all injuries caused by his misconduct [where] 
in contract, undoubtedly out of concern for the impact on commerce, 
damages are limited to the types of loss the breaching party had reason to 
anticipate at the time the contract was made.”180 Alternatively, the District 
of Columbia Court of Appeals provided that damages should be tailored by 
estimating the likelihood of success in a potential civil action.181
2. Penalties/Sanctions
One court determined that the “availability of punitive damages 
would only magnify the cost of erroneous liability determinations [and] [t]he 
risk of erroneous spoliation liability could also impose indirect costs by 
causing persons or entities to take extraordinary measures to preserve for an 
indefinite period documents and things of no apparent value solely to avoid 
the possibility of spoliation liability if years later those items turn out to have 
some potential relevance to future litigation.”182 Consequently, the result 
———————————————————————————–
referred to as the ‘all-or-nothing’ approach, has led courts and scholars to 
criticize the rule and carve out exceptions and modifying doctrines.”).
179 Miller, 573 So. 2d at 28-29.
180 Id. at 29.
181 Holmes, 710 A.2d 846; See also Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 
P.2d 11, 21 (Mont. 1999) (providing that even though damages should be 
proven with reasonable certainty, “a defendant should not escape liability 
because the amount of damage cannot be proven with precision . . . . [and 
held] that damages arrived at through reasonable estimation based on 
relevant data should be multiplied by the significant possibility that the 
plaintiff would have won the underlying suit had the spoliated evidence been 
available.”); Rizzuto v. Davidson Ladders, Inc., 905 A.2d 1165, 1181 (Conn. 
2006) (stating that with the difficulty in calculating damages in a spoliation 
of evidence tort, the proper measure of determining damages is “guided by 
the purpose of compensatory damages, which is to restore an injured party 
to the position he or she would have been in if the wrong had not been 
committed.”).
182 See, e.g., Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 
519 (Cal. 1998).
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would be endless, meritless litigation subject to abuse not necessarily for 
evidence that was intentionally destroyed but for evidence that was 
misplaced or discarded accidently in ordinary dealings or practice.183
Alternatively, once a party reasonably anticipates litigation, an 
affirmative duty to preserve evidence may be relevant and subsequently 
spoliation may be established.184 If spoliation is established, the spoliating 
party may be vulnerable to sanctions including: “(1) dismissal of a claim or 
granting judgment in favor of a prejudiced party;185 (2) suppression of 
evidence; (3) an adverse inference, referred to as the spoliation inference; (4) 
fines; [and/or] (5) attorneys’ fees and costs.”186 The Pennsylvania and 
———————————————————————————–
183 See id. at 519; See also Coprich v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
884, 888 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (“The Temple Community court acknowledged that 
fewer sanctions are available to deter spoliation by third parties or to mitigate its 
effects, but it concluded that the burdens and costs on litigants, the judicial system, 
and others would outweigh the benefits of a tort remedy and that the limited 
remedies available are sufficient.”).
184 Memorandum Opinion & Order, Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. 
Cooper Crouse-Hinds, LLC, No. CIV. 05-CV-6399, CMR No. 8 (E.D. Pa. 
Aug. 31, 2007), 2007 WL 2571450, at *4.
185 Cf. Garfoot v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 599 N.W.2d 411, 422 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (declining to hold the requirement that “if the trial court 
determines a party destroyed evidence with a conscious attempt to affect the 
outcome of the litigation or a flagrant knowing disregard of the judicial 
process, the court does not have the discretion to impose a sanction of 
dismissal unless those acts resulted in prejudice to the opposing party.”).
186 See Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Davis, 234 F.R.D. 102, 110-11 (E.D. 
Pa. 2005). See also Mosaid Techs. Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 348 F. Supp. 
2d 332, 335 (D.N.J. 2004) ("Spoliation sanctions serve a remedial function 
by leveling the playing field or restoring the prejudiced party to the position 
it would have been without spoliation [and] [t]hey also serve a punitive 
function, by punishing the spoliator for its actions, and a deterrent function, 
by sending a clear message to other potential litigants that this type of 
behavior will not be tolerated and will be dealt with appropriately if need 
be.”). Cf. Memorandum Opinion & Order, Travelers, CMR No. 12-13 (No. 
CIV. 05-CV-6399), WL 2571450 at *6 (providing that the “Court must 
consider the availability of sanctions less severe than the entry of judgment 
in Defendants’ favor that can adequately protect Defendants’ rights and deter 
future spoliation by Plaintiff or others . . . . [T]he sanction of default 
judgment should be employed only in the most egregious of spoliation 
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Mississippi courts have applied a balancing test to determine sanctions, 
established in a Third Circuit Court of Appeals decision, for both first and 
third party spoliation cases.187 The test to determine whether a sanction is 
appropriate includes: “(1) the degree of fault of the party who altered or 
destroyed the evidence; (2) the degree of prejudice suffered by the opposing 
party; and (3) whether there is a lesser sanction that will avoid substantial 
unfairness to the opposing party.”188 These alternative approaches do not 
work in third-party situations.
In evaluating these three considerations, the court can determine if 
an adverse inference instruction [to the jury] is the least severe and most 
appropriate sanction based on the circumstances of the case, with the purpose 
of deterring similar conduct in future cases.189 An adverse inference applies 
from the “common sense observation that when a party destroys evidence 
that is relevant to a claim or defense in a case, the party did so out of the 
well-founded fear that the contents would harm him.”190 However, there is 
a four-factor test that must be satisfied for the adverse spoliation inference 
to apply including: (1) the evidence in question must be within the party’s 
control; (2) it must show that there has been actual suppression or 
withholding of the evidence; (3) the evidence destroyed or withheld was 
———————————————————————————–
cases . . . . [not in cases where] spoliation apparently resulted from a lack of 
care and a failure to take reasonable precautions to protect the integrity of 
the [evidence] as well as a failure to promptly notify Defendants that their 
product was the potential subject of a subrogation suit.”).
187 Schmid v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 79 (3d Cir. 
1994); Gicking v Joyce Intern, Inc., 719 A.2d 357, 358 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1998); Ogin v. Ahmed, 563 F. Supp. 2d 539, 545 (M.D. Pa. 2008).
188 See Ogin, 563 F.Supp.2d at 545-46 (the court applied the three key 
considerations and found 1) Defendants bear a high degree of fault for the 
destruction of the actual driver's logs because the defendants received both 
notice of pending litigation and actual notice of litigation and they should 
have taken reasonable precautions to preserve the evidence; 2) the 
Defendants actions prejudiced the Plaintiffs because by destroying the 
driver’s logs it was difficult to discern whether there were any negligent 
conduct violations that may gave rise to punitive damages; and 3) an adverse 
inference instruction was the least severe and most appropriate sanction 
based on the circumstances because the Defendants unilaterally determined 
the relevance of the actual driver’s logs and destroyed the records.))
189 Ogin, 563 F.Supp.2d at 546.
190 Mosaid Tech. Inc., 348 F. Supp. 2d at 336 (citation omitted).
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relevant to claims or defenses; and (4) it was reasonably foreseeable that the 
evidence would later be discoverable.191
In Travelers Property Casualty Company of America v. Cooper 
Crouse-Hinds, a fire damaged a building owned by a construction 
company.192 The building was insured through a policy purchased from 
Travelers Property Casualty Company of America [“Plaintiff”].193
Subsequently, Plaintiff hired investigators to determine the fire’s cause and 
found suspicion with a fluorescent light fixture that was hanging above a set 
of wall shelving.194 Photographs were taken and the fixture was removed 
and sent to the Plaintiff’s laboratory for further investigation.195 After further 
investigation, photographs, and discovery of missing parts, it was 
determined the light fixture was the cause of the fire.196 After further 
investigation of the light fixture without the components documented as 
missing, by another hired examiner, the Plaintiff filed a complaint asserting 
claims of strict products liability, negligence, and breach of warranty against 
numerous Crouse-Hinds entities.197 Crouse-Hinds [“Defendants”] filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment claiming the Plaintiff did not provide an 
opportunity for them to examine the allegedly defective light fixture because: 
(1) Defendants received the light fixture almost two years after the Plaintiff’s 
anticipated a subrogation suit; (2) when the fixture was sent to Defendants’ 
counsel, it was missing an additional component; and (3) the components 
were in a substantially different condition than they were when Plaintiff and 
its experts examined the fixture.198 Defendants’ argued that summary 
judgment should be ruled in their favor as a sanction against Plaintiff for 
———————————————————————————–
191 Memorandum Opinion & Order, Travelers, CMR No. 13-14 (No. 
CIV. 05-CV-6399), WL 2571450 at *7; Mosaid Tech. Inc., 348 F. Supp. 2d
at 336; See also Scott v. IBM Corp., 196 F.R.D. 233, 249 (D.N.J. 2000), as 
amended (Nov. 29, 2000) (stating “While a litigant is under no duty to keep 
or retain every document in its possession, even in advance of litigation, it is 
under a duty to preserve what it knows, or reasonably should know, will 
likely be requested in reasonably foreseeable litigation.”).
192 Memorandum Opinion & Order, Travelers, CMR No. 1 (No. CIV. 
05-CV-6399), WL 2571450 at *1.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Id. at CMR No. 3-4 (No. CIV. 05-CV-6399), WL 2571450 at *2.
198 Id. at CMR No. 4 (No. CIV. 05-CV-6399), WL 2571450 at *2.
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spoliation of evidence.199 Conversely, Plaintiff argued that the deterioration 
of the evidence was unintentional and should not be attributed to Travelers 
and the deteriorated evidence did not prejudice Defendants because they 
could test using an exemplar light fixture.200 The Court determined that 
Plaintiffs were subject to sanctions because “a significant segment of 
Plaintiff’s daily operations includes conducting loss investigations for the 
purpose of subrogation actions [and] [they] knew that (1) fire-damaged 
materials are likely to deteriorate over time unless special precautions are 
taken to preserve them; and (2) it was imperative to contact the party 
potentially liable for the fire as soon as possible so that the fixture and its 
components could be examined.”201
In considering sanctions, the Court applied a balancing test to the 
circumstances and found: (1) the Plaintiff was at fault for failing to timely 
notify Defendants that their product was the subject of a subrogation 
investigation, and for failing to provide Defendants with an immediate 
opportunity to examine the fixture;202 (2) Defendants suffered some 
prejudice from the spoliation of the light fixture but only a minimal 
amount;203 and (3) the appropriate sanction was less severe than the entry of 
judgment.204 The Court determined the most logical sanction was an adverse 
———————————————————————————–
199 Id. at CMR No. 4 (No. CIV. 05 -CV-6399), WL 2571450 at *4.
200 Id. at CMR No. 4-5 (No. CIV. 05-CV-6399), WL 2571450 at 
*2; but cf. id. at CMR No. 11 (No. CIV. 05-CV-6399), WL 2571450 at *5
n.28 (noting that “intentional or bad-faith destruction is not required for a 
finding of spoliation [and] [e]ven unintentional destruction, if the result of 
unreasonable conduct, subjects a party to sanctions.”).
201 Id. at CMR No. 10 (No. CIV. 05-CV-6399), WL 2571450 at *5.
202 Id.
203 Id. at CMR No. 11 (No. CIV. 05-CV-6399), WL 2571450 at *6
(providing that prejudice is less for design-defect cases because the 
Defendants could have inspected and tested multiple fixtures of the same 
design and also, examined all the photographs taken immediately after the 
fire).
204 Id. at CMR No. 13 (No. CIV. 05-CV-6399), WL 2571450 at *6
(recognizing the Plaintiffs did not intentionally destroy the evidence.
Rather, the spoliation resulted from lack of care and failure to take 
reasonable precautions to protect the light fixture. Thus, the sanction “must 
remedy the injustice done to the injured party, punish the spoliator for its 
wrongful conduct, and deter the spoliator and other potential spoliators by 
alerting litigants before this Court that this type of behavior will not be 
tolerated in the future.”).
2017                   RESOLVING THIRD-PARTY INSURANCE
                    COMPANY AUTOMOBILE SPOLIATION CLAIMS  
 
117
spoliation inference.205 Moreover, in applying the four-factor test, the Court 
found each factor was satisfied because (1) Plaintiff was in possession of the 
light fixture, and thus the fixture was within its control; (2) by not notifying 
Defendants of the subrogation suit in a timely manner, key components of 
the light fixture were destroyed before Defendants could examine them; (3) 
the destroyed components were relevant to causation issues in this case; and 
(4) as soon as Plaintiff began contemplating a subrogation suit against 
Defendants, it was reasonably foreseeable that the components would later 
be discoverable by Defendants in order to prepare their defense against 
Plaintiff.206 The Court declined to enter summary judgment against Plaintiff 
based on the spoliation of design-defect theory however, based on the 
Plaintiff’s failure to preserve the evidence, the Court concluded a spoliation 
inference was appropriate to instruct the jury.207
V. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE 
TORT
To ensure that a party’s property interest is protected while 
prohibiting a party from discarding evidence it knows to be relevant in a 
specific lawsuit, an appropriate approach is to apply the actual knowledge 
standard of conduct to an insurance carrier.  Without proper notice of a 
lawsuit to the spoiler, an insurance company should be able to dispose of the 
property as they wish.  An insurance company should be put on notice prior 
to a duty being imposed and, if so, then they should be able to negotiate 
costs.208 The mere fact that an insurance company takes possession of an 
automobile should not amount to the creation of a duty in itself to preserve 
evidence in possible civil litigation between a motorist and third party absent 
actual notice of the policyholder’s intent to sue.  Notice requirements are not 
only necessary but vital to the interests of society as a whole in ensuring that 
premiums remain reasonably low and encouraging policyholders to remain 
insured.  Imposing a duty of care, in the absence of such a requirement, 
———————————————————————————–
205 Id.
206 Id. at CMR No. 13-14 (No. CIV. 05 – CV – 6399), WL 2571450 at 
*7.
207 Id.
208 Johnson, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 237 ("A similar uncertainty of the fact of 
harm, though, has been addressed in the prospective economic advantage 
arena … and the costs of preservation can be placed on the person seeking 
preservation.").
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results in the negative consequences of leading a third-party to be in constant 
fear that their property might at some point be needed in a lawsuit, trampling 
traditionally well-protected property interests within our society.209
Stockpiling property places a heavy burden on any third party, such as 
insurance companies, inevitably causing them to preserve evidence in the 
fear of facing liability in some unforeseen potential litigation in the near
future.210
Furthermore, another dilemma emerges because the insured 
ultimately decides whether or not to bring an action and when. As such, the 
transaction costs of storing particular items in an insurance company’s 
possession should be placed on the party making such a request for the 
preservation of evidence.211 Thus, onerous retention policies are not the most 
cost-effective way in handling the negligent spoliation of evidence dilemma 
for a variety of reasons, which can be seen as the majority of the jurisdictions 
addressing the issue decline to impose such a standard on insurance 
companies. 
It is the opinion of the authors that courts should make a categorical 
“no duty” rule regarding third-party spoliation claims involving insurance 
companies’ obligations to preserve auto related damage evidence.  The 
———————————————————————————–
209 See Jonathan Judge, Comment, Reconsidering Spoliation: Common-
Sense Alternatives to the Spoliation Tort, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 441, 451 
(2001).
210 Cty. of Solano v. Delancy, 264 Cal. Rptr. 721, 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1989) (Anderson, P. J. dissenting).
211 Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11, 20 (Mont. 
1999) (recognizing tort action for negligent or intentional third-party 
spoliation, but not for first-party spoliation and stating):
We see no need to require the requesting party to include an offer to 
pay reasonable costs of preservation in the request. In many 
instances, particularly where the evidence is small in size and 
manageable, there will be no costs associated with the 
preservation. However, after receiving such a request, the third party 
may demand the reasonable costs of preservation from the 
requesting party. Of course, the person requesting preservation 
would have the option of deciding whether or not to incur such 
costs. This condition places the burden of preservation where it 
rightfully belongs, on the person or entity requesting preservation.
Id.
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analysis of adopting a “no duty” rule is best illustrated by the Louisiana 
Supreme Court’s decision in Reynolds v. Bordelon.  In determining whether 
society is best served in recognizing a duty, and thus, a tort, the court in 
Reynolds made the following observation:
The same policy considerations which would motivate a legislative 
body to impose duties to protect from certain risks are applied by the 
Court in making its determination. “All rules of conduct, irrespective 
of whether they are the product of a legislature or a part of the fabric 
of the Court-made law of negligence, exists for purposes.  They are 
designed to protect some persons under some circumstances against 
some risks.  Seldom does a rule protect every victim against every 
risk that may befall him, merely because it is shown that the 
violation of the rule played a part in producing the injury.  The task 
of defining the proper reach or thrust of a rule in its policy aspects is 
one that must be undertaken by the Court in each case as it arises.  
How appropriate is the rule to the facts of this controversy?  This is 
a question that the Court cannot escape.212
Analyzing the duty requirement in terms of policy, the Court in Reynolds
systematically walked through each of the policy goals that might exist 
regarding whether to adopt the tort of negligent spoliation in a third-party
context. 
Regarding the first factor—deterrence of undesirable contact—the 
Court found that “the act of negligently spoliating evidence [was] so 
unintentional an act that any recognition of the tort by the courts would not 
act to deter future conduct, but would, rather, act to penalize a party who was 
not aware of its potential wrongdoing in the first place.”213 The Court stated 
that this was “particularly true in the case of negligent spoliation by a third 
party, who is not vested in the ultimate outcome of the underlying case, and 
thus, has no motive to destroy or make unavailable evidence that could tend 
to prove or disprove that unrelated claim.”214 Therefore, the Court found that 
this factor weighed in favor of a no duty rule.  Turning to the second factor—
compensation of victims—was an issue that was strenuously debated 
———————————————————————————–
212 Reynolds v. Bordelon, 172 So. 3d 589, 597 (La. 2015) (citing Hill v. 
Lundin & Assocs., 256 S.2d 620, 623 (La. 1972)); See also Malone,
Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 73 (1956).
213 Reynolds, 172 S.3d at 597.
214 Id.
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nationally among those states that did not recognize the tort because the 
damages were so highly speculative.215 In determining the proper measure 
of damages, the parties and the trier of fact would be called upon to estimate 
the impact of the missing evidence and then guess at its ability to prove or 
disprove the underlying claim, which involved too much speculation.216
Such hypothetical and abstract inquiries regarding damages weighed in favor 
of a no duty rule.217 Next, the Court in Reynolds focused on the third 
consideration—satisfaction of the community’s sense of justice—noting that 
because the reasonable person standard was inherent in the negligence 
analysis, it was prudent for the Court to ask whether reasonable persons 
would expect certain behavior and certain situations and, conversely, 
whether reasonable persons could be expected to be exposed to liability in 
certain situations.218 This part of the inquiry focused squarely on 
predictability.219 Commenting upon the policy considerations of social 
justice and predictability, the Court in Reynolds made the following 
insightful observation:
Recognition of the tort of negligence spoliation would place a 
burden on society as a whole, causing third parties who are not even 
aware of litigation to adopt retention policies for potential evidence 
in cases, in order to reduce their exposure to liability.  There is 
simply no predictability in requiring preservation and recordkeeping 
for unknown litigation.  Moreover, broadening the delictual liability 
for negligent spoliation would place restrictions on the property 
rights of persons, both natural and juridical insofar as the tort would 
act to limit the right to dispose of one’s own property.  These policy 
concerns are readily apparent in the facts before this Court where 
[the insurance company] paid to the [insured] what was owed under 
his policy and received the title to the total vehicle.  Then [the 
vehicle storer/custodian] in the normal course of its business, 
received the vehicle and disposed of it by auctioning it to a salvage 
yard for spare parts.  To impose a requirement that all potential 
evidence be preserved for possible future litigation would wreak 
havoc on an industry whose very existence is sustained by 
destruction of possible subjects of litigation:  totaled vehicles.  It is 
———————————————————————————–
215 Id. 
216 Id. at 598.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id.
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easy to imagine the trickle-down effect that a preservation policy 
would have on insureds themselves; the longer an insurer or auction 
company is required to store a vehicle, the higher the costs, and the 
more likely insurance premiums would be increased to absorb those 
costs.  Moreover, the delay in proceeds being remitted to the insurer 
at the time of the auction prevents those funds from being 
immediately available to offset the total loss payout the insurer pays 
to the insured.  Again, this practice could result in higher costs for 
the public.220
The Court in Reynolds found that the two factors of social justice and 
predictability, weighed heavily against broadening the delictual obligation 
for negligent spoliation.221
The Court in Reynolds identified five public policy considerations 
that had to be considered in creating a new duty: (1) deterrence of undesirable 
conduct; 222 (2) compensation of victims;223 (3) satisfaction of the 
community’s sense of justice and predictability;224 (4) proper allocation of 
resources, including judicial resources;225 and (5) deference to the 
legislature.226
The proper allocation of resources factor favored a no duty rule.227
Establishing a derivative tort would invite litigation and encourage parties to 
bring new lawsuits where the underlying lawsuit was unsuccessful.228 Such 
derivative litigation, according to the Reynolds court, could open the 
floodgates for endless lawsuits where the losses were speculative at best.229
These lawsuits would also create confusion for fact-finders, particularly 
juries, because it devolved into a trial within a trial.230
———————————————————————————–
220 Id. (emphasis added)
221 Id. (emphasis added)
222 Id at 597
223 Id.
224 Id. at 598
225 Id.
226 Id. at 599
227 Id. at 598
228 Id. at 598
229 Id.
230 Id. The court in Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 710 A.2d 846 (D.C. 
1998), discussed the problems associated with determining proximate cause 
in spoliation of evidence of cases. The court concluded that the plaintiff was 
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Finally, the Court in Reynolds considered the position of the 
Louisiana Legislature.  The Louisiana Legislature deferred to the courts on 
questions of fault and tort law in determining the viability of certain causes 
of action. Because of this, the Reynolds court concluded that the Louisiana 
Legislature did not require recognition of the tort of negligent spoliation.231
Having considered all the policy factors and alternative remedies to 
plaintiffs,232 the Reynolds court observed as alternative remedies the 
———————————————————————————–
required to show “based on reasonable inferences derived from both existing 
and spoliated evidence, that the underlying lawsuit was significantly 
impaired, that the spoliated evidence was material to that impairment and 
that the plaintiff enjoyed a significant possibility of success in the underlying 
claim.” Id. at 850. The court noted that it was “too heavy a burden on a 
plaintiff to show that he or she would have won with the missing evidence. 
Such a showing would be nearly impossible because judges and juries [could 
not] evaluate the value of evidence that they [could not] 
see.” Id. (quoting Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp. 501 N.E.2d 1312, 1322 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1986)). For a plaintiff to recover for the destruction of evidence, 
the plaintiff must likely first pursue and lose the underlying claim. To plead 
causation, the plaintiff must allege that an injury proximately resulted from 
the breach of a duty. Therefore, in a negligence action involving the loss or 
destruction of evidence, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to support a 
claim that the loss or destruction of the evidence caused the plaintiff to be 
unable to prove an underlying lawsuit. This is so because a threat of future 
harm, not yet realized, should not be actionable. The wrongful conduct must 
impinge upon a person. If the plaintiff is able to establish their claim in the 
underlying lawsuit without the missing evidence, then the plaintiff has not 
been injured by the loss of the evidence. It is easy to envision factual 
situations where a party has negligently lost or destroyed evidence, but that 
evidence was not critical or even material to the plaintiff’s underlying suit.
231 Reynolds, 172 So. 3d at 599.
232 Additionally, Louisiana recognizes the adverse presumption against 
litigants who had access to evidence and did not make it available or 
destroyed it. Regarding negligent spoliation by third-parties, the Plaintiff 
who anticipates litigation can enter into a contract to preserve the evidence 
and, in the event of a breach, avail themselves of those contractual 
remedies. Court orders for preservation are also obtainable. In this 
particular case, the Plaintiff also could have retained control of his vehicle 
and not released it to the insurer, thereby guaranteeing its availability for 
inspection. Furthermore, he could have bought the vehicle back from the 
insurer for a nominal fee. Id. at 600.
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following: “discovery sanctions and criminal sanctions are available for first-
party spoliators.
Decades ago, a wise court noted “[t]he risk reasonably to be 
perceived defines the duty to be obeyed….”233 When dealing with negligent 
spoliation claims involving third party insurance companies, there are no 
broad concerns of deterring wrongful but potentially profitable litigation-
related conduct or of preserving the integrity of the civil justice system.234
The Reynolds court properly noted the potentially harsh consequences facing 
unsuspecting third parties with regard to spoliation:
[T]he act of negligently spoliating evidence is so unintentional an 
act that any recognition of the tort by the courts would not act to 
deter future conduct, but would, rather, act to penalize a party who 
was not aware of its potential wrongdoing in the first place.  This is 
particularly true in the case of negligent spoliation by a third party, 
who is not vested in the ultimate outcome of the underlying case, 
and thus, has no motive to destroy or make unavailable evidence that 
could tend to prove or disprove that unrelated claim.235
This limited risk calls for a limited duty.236 If a third party negligent 
spoliation duty is going to be imposed, such a duty should be limited to 
situations where there is an express agreement by the parties or a specific 
request that is made by the insured accompanied by an offer to bear the 
burden of preserving the evidence.237
In total vehicle loss situations, the insured can retain control of his vehicle 
and not release it to the insurer, thereby guaranteeing its availability for 
inspection.  However, the policy’s implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing will require the insured to work out a financial arrangement with the 
insurer to pay the salvage value of the vehicle.  Any request for preservation 
should be made in writing with proof of delivery to the insurance company.  
The so-called mailbox rule should not be utilized as a presumption of 
delivery.  This approach secures the necessary predictability.  If any duty is 
going to be imposed upon the insurance company, the cornerstone of the duty 
———————————————————————————–
233 Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928).
234 Johnson v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 234, 240 
(1998).
235 Reynolds, 172 S.3d at 597.
236 Johnson, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 240.
237 Id.
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should be actual, specific knowledge coupled with mutual agreement and a 
promise of payment for the relevant property.  Otherwise, there is no 
predictability in requiring preservation and recordkeeping for unknown 
litigation.
VI. CONCLUSION
The words of the Louisiana Supreme Court encapsulate why an 
independent cause of action for negligent spoliation of evidence by insurance 
companies should not be adopted.  The Court observed:  “To impose a 
requirement that all potential evidence be preserved for possible future 
litigation would wreak havoc on an industry whose very existence is 
sustained by destruction of possible objects of litigation: [partially damaged 
or] totaled vehicles.”238 “[T]he act of negligently spoliating evidence is so 
unintentional an act [for insurance companies resolving automobile physical 
damage claims] that any recognition of the tort by the courts would not act 
to deter future conduct, but would, rather, act to penalize a party who is not 
aware of its potential wrongdoing in the first place and who had a contractual 
obligation to repair damaged vehicles and a contractual right to take the 
salvage of a totaled vehicle.”239
———————————————————————————–
238 Reynolds, 172 So. 3d at 598.
239 Id at 597.
